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CREATING CLONES, KIDS & CHIMERA:
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC COMPROMISE
AT THE CROSSROADS
NATHAN A. ADAMS, IV*
I am thy creature, and I will be even mild and docile to my
natural lord and king if thou wilt also perform thy part,
that which thou owest me.1
Most agree that biotechnology is leading to a revolution in
medicine. Less appreciated is the challenge biotechnology poses
to the prevailing liberal democratic consensus pertaining to
health and welfare. Biotechnology necessarily impinges upon
key health and welfare doctrines at the core of our collective
understanding of what it means to advance personal autonomy,
self-determination, liberty, and equality within a market
economy.
Supporters are confident that the biotechnological industry
will affirm these values and channel potentially life-saving bio-
technological innovations in directions harmless to all but the
human embryo.2 They favor essentially a self-regulated industry,
where medical professionals decide whether and when to create
or modify human clones, kids, and chimera.3 In contrast, oppo-
nents of biotechnology fear the natural inclination of the market
* Nathan A. Adams, IV is Chief Litigation Counsel for Christian Legal
Society in Annandale, Virginia. He holds a J.D. from the University of Texas
School of Law in Austin, Texas (1996); Ph.D. in international political economy
and M.A. in international relations from the University of Florida (1994, 1992);
and B.A. from Wheaton College in Wheaton, Illinois (1989).
1. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN, in THREE GOTHIC NovELs 364 (Peter
Fairclough ed., 1968).
2. See, e.g.,John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX.
L. REv. 1371, 1430-31 (1998) [hereinafter Robertson on Cloning].
3. In ancient Greek mythology, the chimera was a fire-breathing monster
with a lion's head, a goat's body, and a serpent's tail. Thomas A. Magnani, The
Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELuEY TECH. L.J. 443, 443 (1999).
As used in this article, the "human chimera" or, for our purposes, simply "chi-
mera" is a being with some cells from a non-human species and some from a
human species. In this respect, chimera differ from "hybrids," because every
cell of the latter contains one set of chromosomes from one species and one set
from another. Id. at 445. Not every cell of the chimera includes cells of both
species; rather, the chimera incorporates whole cells of one species and whole
cells of another species. Id.
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is to lead us toward " the dehumanized hell of Brave New World."
4
They assert a fundamental, deontological right to ban or strictly
limit nearly all forms of biotechnological research.
The modest objective of this Article is to find middle ground
between these camps by perpetuating the existing legal compro-
mise pertaining to the complete range of health and welfare doc-
trines relevant to the biotechnological industry. This Article
aspires neither to add to nor detract from this liberal democratic
consensus, but to preserve its constitutive balance between posi-
tivism and natural law and over-regulation and under-regulation
in the hopes of stabilizing new political fault lines developing
around the few biotechnological innovations already grabbing
headlines.5
Part I explores human cloning and two other key biotech-
nologies that will frame the political debate, including genetic
screening and genetic engineering. To provide an historical
political economic perspective, we compare their development
with a standard model of technological change embracing inven-
tion, innovation, and diffusion. This section concludes that bio-
technology is leading to a more radical transformation of the
political economy than any previous cluster of innovations,
because it will impact not merely our tools, but our species.
Part II identifies the primary international and national
legal regimes that genetic screening, human cloning, and
genetic engineering will either radically alter or which will regu-
late them, including equal protection, reproductive rights, the
First Amendment, human subject experimentation rules, patent
law, and parental rights. From the constitutional and other legal
principles underpinning these regimes we illuminate the con-
tours of the existing liberal democratic consensus.
Part III wrestles with how to extend this consensus to the
biotechnological industry without modifying the existing legal
regimes. It explores a variety of policy recommendations, which
4. The Ethics of Cloning: Testimony Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Subcomm. on Crime, 107th Cong. (June 7, 2001) (statement of Leon R. Kass)
(referencing ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAvE NEW WORLD (1932), available at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/kass_060701.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
5. Some traditional "pro-life" legislators have found common cause with
"pro-choice" legislators favoring human cloning, while other conservative legis-
lators have allied with progressives and feminists against it. See, e.g., Sen. Orrin
G. Hatch, Pro-Life Means Helping the Living: The Case for Regenerative Medicine,
SALT LAKE TRI., Apr. 30, 2002 (pro-life conservative Sen. Orrin Hatch favors
research cloning); Janelle Carter, Senate Debates Human Cloning, ASSOCIATED
PREss, Feb. 5, 2002 (pro-choice liberal Sen. Mary Landrieu co-sponsors bill to
ban human cloning).
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become tougher as the legal issues become less familiar and juris-
prudential philosophies are counterposed. Biotechnology
uniquely raises questions like what rights should be accorded ex
vivo living human embryos. Applying the special respect para-
digm, I conclude human embryos merit some substantive rights
the unregulated biotechnological industry would not accord
them.
In Frankenstein, Mary Shelley reminds us of the conse-
quences of failing to temper technology.6 Victor Frankenstein
created a monster that when released into the world without
direction or moral guidance was left to create a community on its
own violent terms that proved less humanitarian than the society
from which the creature emerged.7 In the last scene, the mon-
ster destroys its creator.8 This Article offers one strategy for
avoiding a similar mistake: merely extending the prevailing legal
regime to govern biotechnology.
I. FRANKENSTEIN INNOVATES
This section explores the radical implications of genetic
screening, human cloning, and genetic engineering for the polit-
ical economy. It compares the path that biotechnology is taking
with a standard model of radical technological change, and con-
cludes that biotechnology will lead to an even more radical trans-
formation of the political economy than other technologies have
caused.
A. Standard Model
Scholars have developed a standard model for technological
change incorporating three phases: invention, innovation, and
diffusion.' Invention is the process of arriving at an idea for a
product or process and demonstrating its feasibility."' Innova-
tion is the process by which the invention is first brought into use
through improvements and refinements of the invention. 1 ' Dif-
fusion involves the spread of the innovation into general use,
6. SHELLEY, supra note 1.
7. See generally id.
8. Id.
9. See Louis A. GIRIFALCO, DYNAMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 3
(1991);JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1966).
10. GIRIFALCO, supra note 9, at 3.
11. Id.
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thereby impacting the political economy. 2 Ordinarily, this pro-
cess follows what is termed an S-curve.
a3
At the bottom of the S-curve, the slope is relatively flat. This
is because in the initial phase after invention, an innovation
spreads slowly due to its high price, novelty, and inefficiency. 4
As the innovation improves, more consumers adopt it, providing
experience, feedback, and funds for additional advances
attracting more consumers.' 5 The curve steepens as diffusion
increases rapidly. However, the rate of diffusion ultimately slows
again as further improvements are impossible, economies of
scale are maximized, and most of the public has purchased the
innovation. 6 The S-curve flattens again at this point.
Innovations usually cluster together, reinforcing one
another and diffusing together along the S-curve or slowing one
another down. 7 Bottlenecks involving one innovation in a clus-
ter can hinder diffusion of others, whereas advances with one
may accelerate the diffusion of others.'" The invention of the
Watt engine with a separate condenser is an example of the lat-
ter, because it led to a chain of innovations improving steam
engine performance, including rotary motion, the governor, the
compound engine, and the high-pressure engines.' 9 Improve-
ments in metallurgy, especially iron and steel, also improved the
efficiency of the steam engine.
20
Bottlenecks or advances in technological diffusion are
caused not only by technology, but also the legal, institutional,
12. Id.
13. Id. at 43. An example of an S-curve is set forth below:
FIGURE A




PAUL STONEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL DIFFUSION 13 (2002).
14. GiRiFALco, supra note 9, at 35.
15. Id. at 35, 43.
16. Id. at 33, 35, 40, 43-45.
17. Id. at 31, 40, 43. The clustering phenomenon also means that innova-
tions do not take place at a constant rate, but in spurts.
18. Id. at 40, 43.
19. Id. at 44-45.
20. Id. at 45.
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and managerial environment. 21 The most radical innovations
often arise as pure scientific discoveries, but their diffusion ulti-
mately requires or triggers not merely ancillary technologies, but
also socio-technical and legal adaptation. 22 The doctrine of neg-
ligence, for example, emerged around 1825, as a separate basis
for tort liability "probably stimulated a good deal by the enor-
mous increase of industrial machinery in general and by the
invention of railways in particular."
23
As an innovation interacts with its environment by requiring
or triggering ancillary technologies, socio-technical, and legal
changes, it eventually becomes cheap, reliable, and safe enough
to create significant consumer demand and, thus, to round the
lower S-curve. After introduction of the Watt steam engine and
related improvements together with a new liability system, for
example, steam technology diffused rapidly from rail to water
pumps, sea transport, agriculture, electricity generation, assem-
bly lines, and other areas until the range of possible uses for the
Watt engine was exhausted and further improvement of the
engine was impossible.24
On the upswing of the S-curve, rapid diffusion of an innova-
tion can lead to serious political, social, and economic disloca-
tions. For example, the steam engine and a few other
technologies led to the Industrial Revolution,21 including its radi-
cal new patterns of organization, management, and labor, as well
as its social externalities.
26
21. Harvey Brooks, Social and Technological Innovation, in MANAGING INNO-
VATION: THE SocIAL DIMENSIONS OF CREATIVITY, INVENTION AND TECHNOLOGY
12-14 (Sven B. Lundstedt & E. William Colglzier, Jr. eds., 1992).
22. Id.
23. P.H. WINFIELD, LAW OF TORT 404 (5th ed. 1950) ("At that time railway
trains were notable neither for speed nor for safety. They killed any object
from a Minster of State to a wandering cow, and this naturally reacted upon the
law."). New ways of organizing work and new institutions to market, deliver,
and service a new technology may also be essential to take full advantage of it.
Brooks, supra note 21, at 14.
24. GInuALCO, supra note 9, at 45.
25. Id. at 307-09, 310-12; see also BROOKE HINDLE & STEVEN LUBAR,
ENGINES OF CHANGE: THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1790-1860 15, 21
(1986); G.N. VON TUNZELMANN, STEAM POWER AND BRITISH INDUSTRIALIZATION
TO 1860 (1978); SIMON KUZNETS, MODERN ECONOMIC GROWrH: RATE, STRUC-
TURE, AND SPREAD 10 (1966) ("[O]ne could argue that of the three major tech-
nological inventions associated with the Industrial Revolution-in the fields of
cotton textiles, iron, and the steam engine-the last was by far the most impor-
tant and fundamental to subsequent [economic] growth . . ").
26. The steam engine increased the feasibility of factory production and
mechanization away from water; inspired large corporate organization, occupa-
tional specialization, and urbanization; attracted workers from agrarian employ-
ment and craft guilds; and is associated with the establishment of a modern
2003]
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Structuralists have tried to generalize about the cyclical
impact of radical clusters of innovations on the international
political economy.2 7 At the micro level, product business cycles
are well accepted, suggesting that as a technology ages, social dis-
placements occur as manufacturing moves to less developed
countries where factors of production are cheaper.2" At the
macro level, Kuznets, Schumpeter, and Mensch drew a causal
connection between the so-called Kondratieff long wave and the
most radical technology clusters to date.29 Other scholars have
tried to draw linkages between these long cycles and interna-
tional conflict and changes in world leadership.3 °
system of exchange, cost accounting, communication, transportation networks,
social stratification, pollution, and political centralization. TUNZELMANN, supra
note 25, at 6; Wilbert E. Moore, Industrialization and Social Change, in INDUSTRI-
ALIZATION AND SOCIETY 301 et seq. (Bert F. Hoselitz & Wilbert E. Moore eds.,
1970).
27. Oswald Spengler developed a cultural life cycle model around the
notion that society is held together by a set of implicit assumptions that later
generations challenge and either replace or destroy causing cultural renewal or
decline. See OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST (Charles Atkinson
trans., 1926). Pitiim Sorokin argued that social change is inevitable and must
be compensated for to avoid overwhelming culture. See PITIRIM SOROKIN,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS (abr. 1957). Arnold Toynbee developed the
concept of challenge and response as an organizing principle for understand-
ing human history. See ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY (abridgement
by D.C. Somervell 1946). Karl Marx understood dialectic materialism to involve
innovation leading to tension, contradiction, and revolution. See KARL MARX,
DAS CAPITAL (1867); KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANI-
FESTO (1848); see also Marx's View of Technology, in NATHAN ROSENBERG, INSIDE
THE BLACK Box: TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS (1982). Nikolai Kondratieff asso-
ciated innovation with 50-year long cycles bringing prosperity, then recession,
depression, and recovery. William R. Thompson, Long Waves, Technological Inno-
vation, and Relative Decline, 44 Irr'L ORG. 201, 216-17 (1990).
28. Brooks, supra note 21, at 7.
29. GERHARD MENSCH, STALEMATE IN TECHNOLOGY (1979); JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1934); SIMON KUZNETS,
SECULAR MOVEMENTS IN PRODUCTION AND PRICES (1930). According to these
authors, the political economy benefits from a cluster of innovations intro-
duced during a rising business cycle that is exhausted when the innovations
have fully diffused and competition results in lower profits and automation in
fewerjobs. GIRIFALCO, supra note 9, at 17-18. Recession, then depression, stim-
ulates exploration of new opportunities leading to new innovations, restarting
the business cycle. Id. at 18.
30. Richard Rosecrance, Long Cycle Theory and International Relations, 41
INT'L ORG. 283, 286 (1987) (citing NIKOLAi KONDRATElF, THE LONG WAVE
CYCLE 62 (G. Daniels & J. Snyder eds., 1984) ("The greatest number of social
upheavals (wars and revolutions) occur during the periods of the rising wave of
each long cycle."). Skeptics reviewing this research have difficulty empirically
demonstrating the regularity of the long cycles and their nexus with interna-
tional conflict in the modern era, but admit a strong relationship between inno-
vation and economic growth. See GIRIFALCO, supra note 9, at 18. Some believe
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Whether or not these macro linkages exist, the standard
model of technological change clearly suggests it triggers social,
economic, and legal change. This is not to imply a crude techno-
logical determinism diminishing the importance of other influ-
ences.3 Rather, it is merely to emphasize that technological and
social and legal inventions are associated and, further, that the
most radical innovation clusters have been associated with the
most serious dislocations. 2
Biotechnology is among the most radical innovation clusters
ever introduced, because it alone portends modification of the
human species, not merely our tools. It would enable us to iden-
tify and correct genetic "abnormalities," replicate ourselves, and
in the near future modify ourselves and create chimera. The
ability to correct "abnormalities" raises intractable questions like
who and how will we decide which genetic conditions are "abnor-
mal? '33 We disagree about the standard for health and welfare;
therefore, the distinction between "therapy" and "enhancement"
is illusive.34 If therapy loosely conveys treatment aimed at bring-
ing an unhealthy person to health, whereas enhancement con-
long cycles ceased in modern history and others are skeptical altogether of their
correlation with political events; the most charitable analysis reveals the follow-
ing association:
Innovation Period Conflict Hegemon Challenger
Cotton, textiles & iron 1780-1817 Britain France
Railroads, steam & steel 1840-1875 American Civil War Britain France
Electricity, industrial 1875-1920 World War I Britain Germany
chemistry & internal
combustion engine
Automobiles, plastics & 1940-1972 World War 11, Korean War, United States USSR
electronics (including the Vietnam War
semiconductor)
Biotechnology 1973- United States China?
31. Accord Moore, supra note 26, at 301.
32. Accord Brooks, supra note 21, at 2-3. Interestingly, most of the great
technological innovators of the early-twentieth century, such as Henry Ford and
Thomas Edison, also considered themselves social reformers. Id. at 2.
33. Id.; Robertson Parkman, Gene Therapy in the 1990s, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
411, 420 (1991); Gerald Coleman, Genetic Engineering: Should Parents Be Allowed
to Design Their Children?, 34 How. L.J. 153, 165 (1991).
34. President's Council on Bioethics, Staff Working Paper 7: Distinguishing
Therapy and Enhancement, available at http://www.bioethics.gov/workpaper7.
html (last modified Aug. 20, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter Staff Working Paper 7] (noting that
some argue "health" is, to quote the World Health Organization, "a state of
complete physical, mental, and social well-being," rendering virtually every
enhancement also therapeutic, whereas Normal Daniels argues that "disease
and disability are . . . departures from species-typical normal functional organi-
zation or functioning.").
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veys extending some characteristic, capacity, or activity,35 it is
tempting to think that we can adopt a bright line rule permitting
the former, but never the latter. In truth, this would still require
us to define "normality," because therapies always constitute
enhancements, but not vice-versa.36
Most human capacities express themselves along a bell
curve.37 The "normal range" within this curve can be defined
only with respect to standard deviations from the mean. The
number of standard deviations from the mean that count as nor-
mal is arbitrary, as is the cut-off point denying therapy to those
-3 standard deviations from the mean, but not -2.99.31 Often-
times, even those falling on the mean argue they are "disadvan-
taged" relative to those above them.39 Theirs is an argument for
choosing something above the mean as the starting point for
assessing "normality." The act of enhancing also generally
increases the pressure to seek enhancements, thus, contributing
to "norm creep. '"40
In a world where biotechnology has fully diffused, certain
genetic traits most would consider not as good as others, like cys-
tic fibrosis (CF), could be eliminated and others improved until,
according to some, excellence itself would become less a func-
tion of human achievement, behavioral modification, and expe-
rience than biological determinism.41 Outlandish, but possible
in the distant future, would be entire new quasi-human species
with diminished civil rights created for specific tasks, for exam-
ple, chimera without legs to serve on assembly lines.42 Some
non-liberal states might quickly adopt these innovations with rad-
ical implications for the international political economy.
35. Id.
36. Id. As an example, the drug Ritalin is used to treat so-called Attention
Deficit Disorder (ADD), thought to be related to a pituitary deficiency, but is
also taken by Ivy League test-takers to improve concentration. Id. Recombi-
nant human growth hormone (rhGH) is administered to children of short stat-
ure to assist them to attain "normal" height, but may also be administered to
children within the "95% envelope" on the height-age curve in an attempt to
make them taller.
37. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FuTuRE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 130-39 (2002); Staff Working Paper 7, supra note
34.
38. Accord Parkman, supra note 33, at 420.
39. Staff Working Paper 7, supra note 34.
40. Coleman, supra note 33, at 165.
41. Staff Working Paper 7, supra note 34.
42. David A. Prentice, Brave New World of Genetic Engineering, 1 NAT'L
CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 529, 534 (2001).
CREATING CLONES, KIDS & CHIMERA
B. Biotechnological Model
Biotechnology has been defined as the use of biological
organisms for commercial ends. The field embraces a cluster
of innovations at different stages of development, including, for
example, recombinant DNA technology, antisense technology,
DNA amplification, genomics, bioinformatics, proteomics, and
transcriptomics." "Recombinant" means "new combination."45
"Recombinant DNA technology" (rDNA), also known as "genetic
engineering, '"46 refers to a method of inserting genetic material
from one organism into another of either the same or different
species or the process of changing the genetic complement of a
cell or an organism.47
None of these biotechnologies has advanced in isolation.
For example, advances with DNA amplification procedures,
including Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and ligase chain
reaction (LCR), made rDNA viable;4" progress with bioinformat-
ics (information technology) required to record, catalog, search,
and analyze human DNA facilitated early sequencing of the
human genome by June 2000;"9 and this stunning achievement
43. Martin Fransman, Biotechnology: Generation, Diffusion and Policy, in
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 41, 42 (Charles
Cooper ed., 1994).
44. "Bioinformatics is the term coined for the new field that merges biol-
ogy, computer science, and information technology to manage and analyze
[biotechnological] data, with the ultimate goal of understanding and modeling
living systems." U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY HUMAN GENOME PROGRAM, GENOMICS AND
ITS IMPACT ON MEDICINE AND SOCIETY: A 2001 PRIMER 3 (2001), at http://www.
ornl.gov/hgmis [hereinafter GENOMICS AND ITS IMPACT]. Proteomics is "the
study of protein expression and function." Id. at 6. "Transcriptomics involves
large-scale analysis of messenger RNAs (molecules that are transcribed from
active genes) to determine when, where, and under what conditions genes are
expressed." Id. The genome is an organism's complete set of DNA. Id. at 1.
The study of the genome or genomics may be structural or comparative. Id. at
6. The former involves three-dimensional modeling of proteins to uncover
clues to their functions and provide biological targets for drug design. Id.
Comparative genomics compares DNA sequence patterns of humans with well-
studied model organisms to identify and interpret gene functions. Id.
45. HARRY LEVINE III, GENETIC ENGINEERING: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 11
(1999).
46. Id. at 14; Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse
Cost Perspective, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1597, 1606 (1993).
47. LEVINE, supra note 45, at 11, 14. Antisense technology is in many
respects the converse of rDNA, because its object is to suppress or "knock out" a
gene that a cell normally expresses. Burk, supra note 46, at 1607-09.
48. PCR and LCR make rDNA feasible by amplifying otherwise unusable
samples of DNA. Id. at 1609-10.
49. FUKUYAMA, supra note 37, at 73-74.
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five years in advance of the predicted deadline accelerated iden-
tification of disease-causing genes.5"
The first biotechnological inventions date from the 1970s,
when the first gene was cloned (1973), the first rDNA experi-
ment was performed on an animal (1974), the first cell fused
(fybridoma) (1975), and Sanger and Gilbert independently
developed DNA sequencing methods (1977).51 It was not until
1974 that the public awakened to biotechnology when research-
ers proposed to insert in bacteria a sequence of DNA from a virus
known to cause cancer in monkeys.52 In response to the public
outcry that followed, the scientific community volunteered a 16-
month moratorium on rDNA experiments on animals (except
humans) 53 and the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (DHEW) established the first biotechnological regulatory
body, the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC).4
Diffusion of biotechnology could not begin until 1980, when
the U.S. Supreme Court held that microorganisms are patenta-
ble.55 The same year, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) issued the Cohen-Bayer patent to Stanford University for
the technique related to construction of recombinant DNA
(rDNA).56 In addition, Genentech made its first public offering,
setting a record for the fastest stock price increase in the shortest
time.57 Genentech was the first biotechnological firm, founded
as a spin-off of university-based research in 1976. By the end of
1981, more than 80 biotechnology firms existed in the United
States with close ties to research universities.58
50. Francis S. Collins & Victor A. McKusick, Implications of the Human Gen-
ome Project for Medical Science, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 541 (2001).
51. LEVINE, supra note 45, at 1; Fransman, supra note 43, at 45; Collins &
McKusick, supra note 50, at 540. Essential precursors to the inventions were
Mendel's laws, Garrod's recognition of their application to inborn errors of
metabolism, J.D. Watson and Francis Crick's discovery of the double helical
structure of DNA in 1954, and elaboration of the role of RNA as a messenger
over the next fifteen years. Collins & McKusick, supra note 50, at 540.
52. Joseph M. Rainsbury, Biotechnology on the RAG-FDA/NIH Regulation of
Human Gene Therapy, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 575, 575-76 (2000).
53. LEVINE, supra note 45, at 2-3. Human genetic engineering was
excluded from the moratorium, because it was considered too emotionally
charged and too far from realization. Id. at 3. The moratorium was approved
until NIH Guidelines became available. Id.
54. Rainsbury, supra note 52, at 578-85.
55. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
56. Fransman, supra note 43, at 45, 55.
57. Id. at 46. Genentech shares surged from $35 to $89 per share in
twenty minutes. Id.
58. Id. at 46, 75-77 (Monsanto-Washington Univ.), 78 (Genentech-Stan-
ford Univ.; Celltech-Cambridge Univ.).
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From 1993 to 1999, the biotechnology industry doubled in
size, producing direct revenues in 1999 totaling $20 billion and
indirect revenues totaling $27 billion.59 In the last decade, bio-
technological firms have allied and merged with international
drug companies to acquire manufacturing, marketing, and distri-
bution channels, rendering effective regulation of biotechnologi-
cal innovations an international concern and the notion of an
"American" biotechnological industry misleading.6 ° Most com-
panies now expect that the majority of future drug development
will come from biotechnology.
61
The impact of biotechnology on plants and animals is just
taking shape. The first plant engineered with rDNA technology
made its commercial debut in 1996: corn that incorporated DNA
from bacteria that is toxic to insects." Now, 25% of the corn and
40% of the soybeans that are grown in the U.S. are genetically
modified.63 Overall, ag-biotech plant researchers promise higher
yields of allegedly better tasting produce, grown with less water,
in inferior soil, and less dependent on fertilizer and pesticides.
64
On April 13, 1988, the PTO issued the first patent on a
higher life form, the so-called Harvard onco-mouse, genetically
engineered to express a cancer-causing gene in its mammary tis-
sue for purposes of cancer research.65  Since this date, the
annual U.S. market for animal disease models has reached $1
59. GENOMICS AND ITS IMPACT, supra note 44, at 9 (citing ERNST & YOUNG,
ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY TO THE U.S. ECON-
omy (2000)).
60. See generally Fransman, supra note 43, at 79-81 (Genentech-Eli Lilly
and KabiVitrum (Sweden), Kyowa Hakko and Mitsubishi Chemical (East Asia),
merged in 1990 with Hoffman-LaRoche (Switzerland) and Celltech-The Boots
Co. Sumitomo Corp. and Sankyo (East Asia)); Cheryl D. Hardy, Patent Protection
and Raw Materials: The Convention on Biological Diversity and Its Implications for U.S.
Policy on the Development and Commercialization of Biotechnology, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 299, nn.49-52 (1994).
61. Collins & McKusick, supra note 50, at 543.
62. Fukuyama, supra note 37, at 76 (developed by Ciba Seeds (now Novar-
tis Seeds) and Mycogen Seeds).
63. Melinda Kimble, Press Briefing of the U.S. Delegation to the Sixth
Meeting of the Working Group on Biosafety Convention on Biological Diversity
(1999), at http://www.usinfo.state.gov (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy), cited injasemine Chambers, Note, Patent Eligibility
of Biotechnological Inventions in the United States, Europe, and Japan: How Much Pat-
ent Policy is Public Policy?, 34 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 223, 237 n.4 (2002).
64. David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, Patenting Living Matter in the Euro-
pean Community: Diriment of the Draft Directive, 16 FoRiDHAM INT'L L.J. 990, 994-95
(1992-1993).
65. SHELDON KRIMSKY, BIOTECHNICS & SOCIETY: THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL
GENETICS 44-45 (1991).
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billion.66 In addition, bioindustry has introduced transgenic
farm animals into the market expressing hormones like the
bovine growth hormone (BGH) or other chemicals that animals
do not ordinarily produce in nature.67
In contrast, biotechnology's impact on humans remains
largely theoretical. The next three sections explore two innova-
tions that have begun diffusing (i.e., genetic screening and
human cloning) and one pure invention (i.e., human genetic
engineering) incorporating two approaches: gene transfer
research and germline manipulation.
1. Genetic Screening (GS)
Genetic screening (GS) or DNA-based testing was among
the first commercial medical applications of biotechnology. It is
designed to identify so-called genetic "defects" or "abnormali-
ties," signaled by a mutation in a gene preventing manufacture of
a protein or altering a protein's activity and, thus, the function of
cells and organs.68 Something like GS has been used in a rudi-
mentary form for about two decades in prenatal fetal blood sam-
pling, chorionic villi sampling, amniocentesis, and maternal
serum alphafetoprotein screening. 6" All involve some risk of
fetal death and of infection to the woman.
70
66. Neil Munro, The New Patent Puzzle, 34 NAT'L J. 628 (2002).
67. Ryan M.T. Iwasaka, Note, Chakrabarty to Chimeras: The Growing Need for
Evolutionary Biology in Patent Law, 109 YALE LJ. 1505, 1532 (2000). "Transgenic
animals" are those that carry and express a gene of another species. By 1999,
the PTO had received over 1,900 patent applications for genetically altered ani-
mals. Id. at 1507; see also Linda Maher, The Environment and the Domestic Regula-
tory Framework for Biotechnology, 8J. ENVrL. L. & LITG. 133, 149 (1993) (BGH is a
bio-engineered protein hormone that significantly increases milk production in
cows); Nicholas D. Kristof, Part Cow, Part Man, All Business: Bioengineering is a
Growth Industry, PiITSBURGH POsT-GAZETE, Aug. 7, 2002, at A15.
68. Charles F. De Jager, Note, The Development of Regulatory Standards for
Gene Therapy in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1303, 1307 (1995).
69. LEVINE, supra note 45, at 19; Natalie Smith, Note, The Right to Genetic
Privacy? Are We Unlocking the Secrets of the Human Genome Only to Risk Insurance
and Employment Discrimination?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 705, 707-08, 716; Lori B.
Andrews, Prenatal Screening and the Culture of Motherhood, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 967,
968 (1996) [hereinafter Andrews on Prenatal Screening].
70. Andrews on Prenatal Screening, supra note 69, at 968.
Fetoscopy, in which blood is sampled from the fetus while it is in
utero, is associated with a 3% to 6% risk of fetal death. Chorionic villi
sampling, in which tissue surrounding the fetus is sampled and ana-
lyzed between eight and twelve weeks of gestation, is associated with a
2% to 3% spontaneous abortion rate. Amniocentesis, in which fluid
from the amniotic sac is withdrawn and analyzed, causes spontaneous
abortion in approximately one or two per thousand pregnancies.
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Carrier screening, a more recent form of GS, involves identi-
fying unaffected individuals who carry one copy of a gene for a
disease that requires two copies for the disease to be expressed. 1
As an example, potential carriers are commonly tested today for
Tay-Sachs or sickle cell anemia.72 The least utilized form of GS is
pre-symptomatic GS, which may be utilized to confirm diagnoses
of a symptomatic individual and for forensic testing.
73
Altogether, there are currently several hundred genetic tests
in clinical use and many more in development, including so-
called "multi-plex testing" in which numerous genetic tests are
performed on a single tissue sample. 4 Currently, most genetic
tests reveal only a probability for developing a disorder.75 Genes
do not entirely determine most diseases; environmental and
other factors like age, exercise, and diet play an important role.76
Studies of identical twins reveal that individuals with the same
genetic makeup do not develop the same diseases and disorders.
Furthermore, some diseases are not inherited at all, but acquired
after birth as a result of an alteration of the genetic code. 77 Vari-
ous forms of cancer are acquired diseases.78
GS is not useful for determining whether an individual will
develop an acquired disease; however, between acquired and
inherited diseases are "complex gene-influenced conditions that
have a predisposition to the development of a disease. '79 An
example of this is breast cancer for which there is now a genetic
test of limited reliability.8 ° Technological refinements in GS may
improve their predictive value and, some believe, reveal disputed
71. Id. at 761.
72. Id. at 970.
73. The most sophisticated GS techniques involve direct examination of
the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) molecule. Human Genome Project Information:
Gene Testing, www.ornl.gov/hgmis/medicine/genetest.html (last modified Feb.
18, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
Dated GS methods include biochemical testing for such gene products as
enzymes and other proteins and microscopic examination of stained or fluores-
cent chromosomes. For some types of genetic tests, researchers design short
pieces of DNA called probes, which bind to and flag mutations. Other proce-
dures involve comparing a patient's DNA with a "normal" sequence. Id.
74. LEVINE, supra note 45, at 18; Andrews on Prenatal Screening, supra
note 69, at 968, 970.
75. Smith, supra note 69, at 746.
76. Id. at 713; Jill Gaulding, Note, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in
Insurance: What's Fair?, 80 CoRNELL L. REv. 1646, 1666 (1995).
77. Smith, supra note 69, at 714.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 715 (citations omitted).
80. GENOMICS AND ITS IMPACT, supra note 44, at 7; Smith, supra note 69, at
2003]
84 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
genetic linkages to conditions and behaviors like aggression, sex-
uality, and intelligence.8
2. Human Cloning (HC)
Human cloning (HC) may be performed in two ways: (1)
somatic nuclear transfer (SCNT), or (2) parthenogenesis.82 The
latter procedure remains largely theoretical and involves chemi-
cally inducing egg cells to divide without fertilization.8"
Researchers employing the experimental SCNT procedure insert
DNA drawn from an adult into an egg stripped of its nucleus
(enucleated),84 then stimulate the genetically modified egg to
commence embryonic development.85 The result is a living
human embryo nearly genetically identical to the DNA donor.
86
Alternatively, the simplest chimera could arise from HC if
researchers inserted human DNA into an animal egg or vice-
versa.
SCNT is rarely successful when performed on complex life
forms. As an example, only about 20% of cow clones survive to
the blastocyst stage of embryonic development.8 7 Once created,
the clone's fate depends upon the purpose of the experiment.
Researchers distinguish between so-called "reproductive cloning"
and so-called "therapeutic cloning."88 The former would lead to
81. Smith, supra note 69, at 715.
82. See, e.g., Joannie Fischer, The First Clone, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 3, 2001, at 50; Gina Kolata & Andrew Pollack, A Breakthrough on Cloning?
Perhaps or Perhaps Not Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at Al; Joyce Price, Human
Embryo Cloned for First Time, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2001, at A1;Jose Cibelli et al.,
The First Human Cloned Embryo, Sci. Am., Jan. 2002, at 44 [hereinafter Cibelli I].
83. See Sylvia Westphal, Stem Cells from Embryo Created Without Sperm, NEW
SCIENTIST, Feb. 12, 2002, at 8; Raja Mishra, Eggs Produce Stem Cells and Widen
Debate on Life, B. GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Mishra I].
84. Jose Cibelli et al., Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer in Humans: Pronuclear
and Early Embryonic Development, 2 E-BIOMED: J. REGENERATIVE MED. 25 (2001)
[hereinafter Cibelli II].
85. Id.
86. Human clones created through SCNT would not be exactly like their
DNA donors, because human DNA is located in the mitochondria of the enu-
cleated ovum. Therefore, unless the same woman who acts as the genetic
donor donates the ovum, clones will not possess identical mitochondrial DNA.
Duane Nash, Recommended Response for Human Cloning Patent Applications, 42
IDEA 279, 285 (2002).
87. Kolata & Pollack, supra note 82, at A12.
88. The biotechnology industry increasingly refers to "therapeutic clon-
ing" as simply "nuclear transplantation" to avoid any association with cloning.
See Bert Vogelstein et al., Please Don't Call It Cloning!, 295 Sci. 1237 (2002); Jac-
queline Stenson, Change Name of Therapeutic Cloning: Scientists, REuTERs, Feb. 14,
2002.
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a born clone, whereas the latter would lead to killing and canni-
balizing the clone for its constituent parts.
Today, about 97% of the simplest cloned animals die prior
to birth in cloning trials.8 9 Dolly is the extraordinary exception.
Dr. Ian Wilmut, Dolly's creator, began with 277 enucleated sheep
eggs, and wound-up with a single sheep; twenty-nine became
embryos that were implanted in thirteen sheep; twelve out of
thirteen of the sheep miscarried.9" In a lesser-known experiment
to replicate transgenic animals, Dr. Wilmut began with 425 enu-
cleated sheep eggs, and wound up with fourteen embryos.9 1 Six
lambs born alive after artificial inducement were nearly twice the
average weight and died within days of birth.9 2
In general, born clones suffer from serious-some say
"gross"-genetic abnormalities and, therefore, live short lives.
This is likely due to dormant genetic abnormalities that blossom
with age, bypassing the protective mechanisms present in germ
cells that correct DNA errors,9" as well as the chronological age
of the DNA inserted into the egg (which is that of an adult, not
an infant). Dolly, for example, is aging prematurely and will
have to be put down.94
Dr. Wilmut and most scientists favor a ban on cloning to
produce children for these and utilitarian and psychological rea-
sons, including the pressures parents might place upon a cloned
child to be similar to a lost one or the possibility that genetic
twins would come into the world years apart.95 These precon-
ceived expectations are totally absent with respect to naturally
occurring twins and, according to a few commentators, could
give rise to a form of "genetic bondage."9 6 Introducing clones
89. Kolata & Pollack, supra note 82, at A12.
90. GINA KOLATA, CLONING: THE ROAD TO DOLLY AND THE PATH AHEAD
239 (1998); Lawrence Wu, Note, Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is
There a Fundamental Right?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1467 (1998).
91. Lori B. Andrews, Is There A Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to
Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 643, 651-52 (1998) [hereinafter
Andrews on Cloning] (referencing 425 enucleated eggs, rather than 277).
92. Id.
93. Nash, supra note 86, at 288.
94. Camillo Fracassini, Dolly the Sheep's Creator Admits She May Have to be
Put Down, SCOT. ON SUNDAY, Jan. 6, 2002, at 1; Cloned Sheep Dolly Develops Arthri-
tis, REUTERS, Jan. 4, 2002. Likewise, of ten pigs recently born through cloning,
researchers destroyed five due to defects including heart failure, lameness, and
anemia. Cloned Animals Suffer Death, Deformities According to Leading Journal Arti-
cles, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 13, 2002, available at http://www.usnewswire.com (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
95. KOLATA, supra note 90, at 239, 243; Cloned Animals Suffer Death, Defor-
mities According to Leading Journal Articles, supra note 94.
96. Andrews on Cloning, supra note 91, at 655, 668.
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who are replicas of family members including elder children,
dead persons, and parents would have unknown implications for
family stability. They could also lead to unsafe reproduction pat-
terns and kinship and lineage confusion.97 Cloning for the pur-
pose of replication may also obviously give rise to new species.
Presently, the biotechnology industry is interested not in
cloning to produce children, or what we shall refer to as "repro-
ductive cloning," but in cloning for the purpose of biomedical
research, or what we shall refer to as "research cloning." The
industry would permit cloned embryos to develop for five to
seven days to the point where they are marked by a peripheral
cellular layer called the trophoblast or feeding layer (which
becomes the embryonic placenta) surrounding an inner central
cavity called the blastocyst (which gives rise to the embryo), then
terminate them, derive their stem cells, and coax or differentiate
the stem cells into a tissue type needed for research.9"
3. Human Genetic Engineering (GE)
Human genetic engineering (GE) would modify the genetic
makeup of persons either by modifying body (somatic) cells that
comprise the organs and tissues of a person or the germ cells
(gametes, zygotes, and early-embryos) that pass on parental
genes to the next generation.99 GE performed on somatic cells
never results in an inheritable trait, may be administered either
ex vivo or in vivo, and is called "gene transfer research" or, less
appropriately "gene therapy."100 GE on germ cells permanently
97. Without statutory assistance, human clones could be subject to multi-
ple kinship claims; for example, by the egg donor, DNA donor, and gestational
mother; and could mistakenly reproduce with persons sharing familial DNA.
98. Some refer to five to seven day old human embryos as "pre-embryos,"
"activated cells," or "cleaving cells"; however, there is no scientific basis for this
distinction. See, e.g., RONAN O'RAHiLLY & FArnoLA MULLER, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY
& TERATOLOGY (3d ed. 2001).
99. LEVINE, supra note 45, at 23; Human Genome Project Information: Gene
Therapy, www.ornl.gov/hgmis/medicine/genetherapy.html (last modified Nov.
21, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy)
[hereinafter Gene Therapy].
100. LEVINE, supra note 45, at 23; STUART H. ORKIN & ARNO G. MOTULSKY,
NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANEL TO
ASSESS THE NIH INVESTMENT IN RESEARCH ON GENE THERAPY (1995), available at
www.nih.gov/news/panelrep.html (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter REPORT ON RESEARCH ON GENE THERAPY];
Eugene H. Kaji &Jeffrey M. Leiden, Gene and Stem Cell Therapies, 285J. AM. MED.
ASS'N 545, 545 (2001) (the ex vivo approach involves carrying out genetic modi-
fications on cultured cells that are subsequently administered to the patient,
whereas the in vivo approach involves inserting a healthy gene in a vector for
delivery to a diseased area of the body).
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modifies a population's genetic endowment and is called
"germline manipulation."'10 '
a. Gene Transfer Research
Gene transfer research comprises a variety of approaches
including: (1) introducing a gene that supplements the function
of a mutated gene, adds a missing function, or regulates the
expression of another gene; (2) directly repairing a mutated
gene; or (3) suppressing a gene. 112 The goal of gene transfer
research is to treat diseases in an individual patient by adminis-
tering genetic material (DNA) rather than a drug.'0° The suc-
cess of the strategy hinges both on the delivery of genetic
material into the target cells and the expression of the gene once
it reaches its target site.'0 4
Most gene transfer research procedures involve three com-
ponents: (1) a gene or other nucleic acid; (2) a vector that allows
delivery of the gene or nucleic acid to the appropriate cell; and
(3) a device to deliver the gene-vector combination to the appro-
priate tissue in vivo.10 5 The most common vectors are human or
animal viruses, which mix with progenitor cells from the
patient's bone marrow. 10 6 When the virus splices its genes into
those of the bone marrow cells, it simultaneously inserts the gene
for the missing enzyme.'0 7 Special bacterial enzymes "cut and
101. Christine Willgoos, Note, FDA Regulation: An Answer to the Questions of
Human Cloning and Germline Gene Therapy, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 101, 105 (2001);
De Jager, supra note 68, at 1308-09; Burk, supra note 46, at 1613.
102. Advisory Comm. to the Dir., Nat'l Insts. of Health, Enhancing the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects in Gene Transfer Research at the National Institutes of Health
5, (July 12, 2000), available at http://www.nih.gov/about/director/07122000.
htm (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [here-
inafter Enhancing the Protection of Human Subjects] (gene therapy comprises three
approaches including: (1) altering or supplementing the function of a mutated
gene by providing a copy of a normal gene; (2) directly altering or repairing a
mutated gene; or (3) providing a gene that adds missing functions or regulates
the expression of another gene); Burk, supra note 46, at 1611 (gene therapy
may be used to suppress genes).
103. Enhancing the Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 102, at 5.
104. Id.; see also Burk, supra note 46, at 1611-13.
105. Kaji & Leiden, supra note 100, at 546.
106. SUNIL MAULIK & SALIL D. PATEL, MOLECULAR BIOTECHNOLOGY: THER-
APEUTIC APPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIES 39, 41-50 (1997).
107. LEVINE, supra note 45, at 12.
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paste" DNA into new sequences."0 8 Then, as the infected cell
replicates, the new gene multiplies. °9
In 1980, UCLA physician Martin Cline unsuccessfully con-
ducted the first gene transfer research on human subjects over-
seas (some believe to avoid U.S. law).11° Dr. Cline was criticized
and demoted for what others deemed premature research.111 It
took ten more years before the research community heralded the
first gene research success, which critics contend is at best incon-
clusive since it imposed a gene research protocol over non-
genetic treatment."l 2 The trial has enabled one child afflicted
with Severe Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID) to live a rela-
tively normal life years later.'
13
In the interim between Cline's unmitigated failure and
French's disputed success, the RAC and the FDA, which first
asserted jurisdiction over rDNA products in 1984, elaborated reg-
ulatory guidelines for gene transfer trials. 1 4 Initially, the
approval process was a laborious case-by-case process, requiring
the approval of seven gatekeepers." 5 However, in response to
patient advocacy groups, NIH Director Harold Varmus led a suc-
108. Id.; MAULIK & PATEL, supra note 106, at 39, 41-50; Burk, supra note
46, at 1606-07. DNA may be inserted into tissues through direct injection, but
this is ordinarily considered a crude approach and is not suitable for many tis-
sues. Id. at 53.
109. LEVINE, supra note 45, at 12; MAULIK & PATEL, supra note 106, at 39.
110. Rainsbury, supra note 52, at 578.
111. Id.
112. Angela Liang, Gene Therapy: Legal and Ethical Issues for Pregnant
Women, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 61, 65 (1999); Larry R. Churchill et al., Genetic
Research as Therapy: Implications of "Gene Therapy" for Informed Consent, 26 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 38, 44 (1998).
113. Churchill et al., supra note 112, at 44 ("Blood tests indicated that
over 50 percent of [one child's] circulating T cells contained the new, cor-
rected gene after three years, compared to only 0.1 to 1 percent in the second
patient-subject."). Less than 100 persons worldwide have SCID, a single-cell
hereditary disease and, thus, are unable to produce the ADA enzyme. These
children (also known as "bubble kids") experience chronic and repeated infec-
tion. LEVINE, supra note 45, at 12; NAT'L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST.,
RESULTS FROM FIRST HUMAN GENE THERAPY CLINICAL TRIAL, at http://www.
nhgri.nih.gov (Oct. 19, 1995) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter RESULTS FROM GENE THERAPY TRIAL];
Churchill et al., supra note 112, at 44.
114. Rainsbury, supra note 52, at 578-85.
115. These included the following: (1) the full body of RAC; (2) a sub-
committee of RAC dealing exclusively with human gene engineering, now
called the Human Gene Therapy Sub-committee (HGTS); (3) the FDA; (4) the
institutional review board (IRB) at the National Cancer Institute; (5) the IRB at
the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute; (6) a hospital safety committee;
and (7) the NIH's Institutional Biohazard Committee (formed to oversee rDNA
research locally). Id. at 583.
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cessful effort in the mid-1990s to expedite and consolidate this
process. 16 Gene research trials on humans multiplied. Between
1989 and May 2000, 280 new gene transfer drug applications for
trials on humans were submitted to the FDA, with 206 still active
in May 2000.117 By 1995, NIH reported its researchers had filed
eighty-one gene research-related patent applications and that a
total of 597 subjects had undergone gene transfer experi-
ments.' 8 These applications dealt with single-cell hereditary
genetic abnormalities and a few more complex diseases like can-
cer and AIDS.119
In September 1999, just as NIH seemed to be routinizing
gene transfer research, healthy 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger died
from a severe immunological response to the administration of a
gene transfer product in an adenoviral vector gene transfer
clinical trial.120  Congressional hearings followed, leading to
slightly modified NIH research protocols, calling for additional
adverse-event reporting to the RAC and fuller disclosure of
potential conflicts of interest on the part of an investigator and
institution. 121
The incident underscored problems with existing vectors
and, specifically, the industry's underdeveloped understanding
of the biological interaction of vectors with their host (including
toxicity, immune and inflammatory responses).122 The develop-
ment of gene delivery devices and research on multiple-gene
caused diseases lags even further behind. 23 Where multiple
genes are involved, they interact with each other and the envi-
ronment in complex ways, "rendering their identification orders
of magnitude more difficult than for single gene defects.'
'1 24
Nevertheless, as ofJune 2001, more than 500 clinical gene trans-
116. Varmus eliminated the HGTS, rendered the RAC solely an advisory
body, and shifted most authority to the FDA. Id. at 585-92.
117. Enhancing the Protection of Human Subjects, supra note 102, at 19.
118. REPORT ON RESEARCH ON GENE THERAPY, supra note 100, at 4, 27.
119. Gene Therapy, supra note 99, at 38-39; Rainsbury, supra note 52, at
585.
120. Rainsbury, supra note 52, at 593; Enhancing the Protection of Human
Subjects, supra note 102, at 2.
121. Rainsbury, supra note 52, at 594-95; Enhancing the Protection of
Human Subjects, supra note 102, at 5, 15-17.
122. See REPORT ON RESEARCH ON GENE THERAPY, supra note 100, at 1-2;
MAULIK & PATEL, supra note 106, at 42; Gene Therapy, supra note 99; Kaji & Lei-
den, supra note 100, at 546 (discussing alternative vectors and their present
shortcomings).
123. Kaji & Leiden, supra note 100, at 547.
124. Collins & McKusick, supra note 50, at 542.
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fer research trials involving 3,500 patients worldwide had been
conducted, including roughly 78% in the United States.' 25
b. Germline Manipulation
Germline manipulation hinges upon many of the technolo-
gies discussed in the last section, in addition to fairly routine JVF
egg recovery, artificial fertilization, cyropreservation, and thaw-
ing techniques.126 All the cells derived from the first altered
germ cell, including the gametes that will engender the embryo's
offspring, will carry the new genetic alteration. 2 7 Germline
manipulation has been practiced on animals for roughly twenty
years, primarily mice (e.g., the Harvard onco mouse); 128 however,
there are no reports of researchers knowingly attempting
germline manipulation on humans. 29 In fact, it is contrary to
current federal policy to review research proposals for germline
manipulation on human beings, whether or not born. 3 ° It is
likely to be at least two decades before clinical trials are
feasible. '
II. THE MONSTER CONFRONTS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
The cluster of biotechnologies we covered in the last section
will shortly emerge at the crossroads of a variety of international
and national legal regimes that biotechnology will either radi-
cally alter or which will regulate biotechnology. We review below
equal protection, reproductive rights, First Amendment, human
subject experimentation, patent, and parental rights law.
125. GENOMICS AND ITS IMPACr, supra note 44, at 8. Most protocols aim at
establishing the safety of gene delivery procedures, rather than their effective-
ness. Id.
126. Burk, supra note 46, at 1613-14.
127. Id. at 1614.
128. Prentice, supra note 42, at 534; Burk, supra note 46, at 1614-15.
129. Prentice, supra note 42, at 536-37. Nevertheless, one published
report indicates that an ART clinic inadvertently engaged in germline manipu-
lation by transferring cytoplasm from a donor human oocyte to an older oocyte
to "rejuvenate" it prior to fertilization. Id.
130. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING
RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES APP. M (2002), available at http://www4.od.nih.
gov/oba/rac/guidelines/guidelines.html (Apr. 2002) (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); RECOMBINANT DNA ADVISORY
COMMITrEE, NAT'L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, RAC STATEMENT, at http://www4.od.
nih.gov/oba/rac/racinutero.htm (Mar. 11, 1999) (on file with the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
131. Willgoos, supra note 101, at 105; Germ-line Gene Therapy Enters the Fore-
seeable Future, GENELETTER, Aug. 1, 1998, at http://www.geneletter.com/
archives/foresfuture.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics
& Public Policy).
CREATING CLONES, KIDS & CHIMERA
A. Legal Regimes GS Implicates
GS raises simpler legal questions than more sophisticated
biotechnologies. This is fortunate because GS is now poised to
diffuse rapidly. Prenatal testing for selected inheritable diseases
like alphafetoprotein (AFP) is already part of the accepted
national standard of care.' 32 Multiplex genetic screening will
shortly become cheaper and more reliable. 33 Now, we must
decide what to do with this information.
1. Equal Protection
The United Nations General Assembly ("General Assembly")
and European Council (EC) have declared illegal discrimination
on the basis of genetic heritage and declared genetic informa-
tion confidential.' 34 Roughly half the American states have done
likewise and a minority has outlawed employment discrimination
relating to genetics. 13 5  Comprehensive federal legislation is
pending.'36 Meanwhile, a variety of federal laws provide some
protection, including the Americans with Disability Act (ADA)
and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
132. See Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents' Freedom to Have Children with
Genetic Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 761, 775.
133. FUKUYAMA, supra note 37, at 75 (concerning introduction of the so-
called DNA chip offered by Affymetrix that automatically screens a DNA sample
for various markers of cancer and other disorders).
134. U.N. ESCO, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and on
Human Rights, arts. 6-9, Nov. 11, 1997, available at http://www.unesco.org/
ibc/en/genome/projet/index.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy); Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,
Council of Europe, art. 11, ETS 164, Apr. 4, 1997, available at http://www.
fuente.de/bioethik/conven6e.htm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
135. See Smith, supra note 69, at 732-33, 742 (at least twenty-three states
have enacted anti-discrimination legislation pertaining to genetics, whereas
only about nine states have enacted anti-discrimination legislation pertaining to
employment).
136. See, e.g., Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and
Employment Act, S. 318, 107th Cong. (2001).
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(HIPA).137 An executive order also prohibits genetic discrimina-
tion against federal employees.
138
Without regulation, genetic discrimination would occur nat-
urally because employers prefer to reduce their medical costs
and minimize employee leave, 139 and insurers seek to match the
highest premiums to those posing the most medical risks.1 4 0
Employers and insurers have already sought to use genetic infor-
mation in this manner."' Not incidentally, the persons dispro-
portionately affected by this genetic discrimination were
minorities.
14 2
As demonstrated by the quick reaction outlawing this,
143
most believe that discriminating on the basis of genes like "the
color of a person's skin and the country of his origin are immuta-
ble facts that bear no relation to ability, disadvantage, moral cul-
pability, or any other characteristics of constitutionally
permissible interest to government[;]"' 4 4 and, thus, violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accord-
ing to the U.S. Supreme Court, "Distinctions between citizens
137. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (1995); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.A. and 42 U.S.C.A.). For a discussion of the applicability of
both to genetic discrimination, see Smith, supra note 69. In 1995, the EEOC
issued a guideline interpreting the ADA to apply to pre-symptomatic individuals
with a genetic predisposition for a disabling condition. See 2 EEOC Compl.
Man. (BNA) § 902.0045 (Mar. 1995).
138. See GARY S. MARx & GARY G. GOLDBERGER, DIsABILrrY LAW COMPLI-
ANCE MANUAL app. B14 (2d ed. 1998).
139. Smith, supra note 69, at 720.
140. Id.
141. In the 1970s, employers discriminated against African-Americans
who were carriers of sickle cell anemia, although their carrier status had no
relation to their health or ability to perform work. Andrews on Prenatal Screen-
ing, supra note 69, at 986-87; see also LORI B. ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS: A
LEGAL FRONTIER (1987). Likewise, shortly after scientists discovered the genes
linked to Tay-Sachs disease and sickle cell anemia, insurers discriminated
against those possessing the genes. Smith, supra note 69, at 707-08; Carol Lee,
Comment, Creating a Genetic Underclass: The Potential For Genetic Discrimination by
the Health Insurance Industry, 13 PACE L. REV. 189, 216 (1993).
142. Ashkenazi Jews and African-Americans disproportionately carry,
respectively, Tay-Sachs disease and sickle cell anemia. John A. Robertson,
Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 441 (1996) [here-
inafter Robertson on Genetic Selection]; Andrews on Prenatal Screening, supra
note 69, at 970.
143. Smith, supra note 69, at 708 (citing ALA. CODE § 27-5-13 (1996); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 626.9706 (West 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:652.1 (West 1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-207 (1994)).
144. Minnick v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 128-29 (1981)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
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solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to
a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality."' 45
On the other hand, those who would permit genetic discrim-
ination contend there is yet no history of invidious discrimina-
tion on the basis of genes.' 46  The closest analogy is
discrimination against the disabled, but the Supreme Court has
not treated the disabled as a quasi-suspect class.' 4 7 Even the ADA
does not entirely prohibit discrimination against them. After
extending a conditional job offer, employers may require GS test
results through a pre-placement medical exam and general medi-
cal record release or family history,'48 and decide whether they
can "reasonably accommodate" a disability.'49
Insurers may also restrict underwriting based on family med-
ical history, a variable closely connected with genes. Last, insur-
ers and employers commonly discriminate on the basis of
intelligence, self-control, and similar factors that may have
genetic links, suggesting that society does not reject all forms of
discrimination on the basis of immutable factors.' 5 ° Indeed, we
prefer employees to reveal medical information that threatens
third parties, for example, airline pilots predisposed to heart
attack. 
15 '
Professor Epstein and others add that preventing discrimina-
tion on the basis of genetics could actually increase discrimina-
tion through proxies and prove far more costly to society than
overtly subsidizing the costs associated with hiring or insuring
individuals with defects.1 52 He would bring the costs the healthy
will pay through, for example, increased insurance premiums
into view "so that honest choices may be made."1 5 ' These costs
would necessarily increase as GS improves.15 1 In fact, some
145. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (quoting Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
146. Colin S. Diver & Jane M. Cohen, Genophobia: What is Wrong with
Genetic Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1476-78 (2001).
147. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366
(2001) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
149. Diver & Cohen, supra note 146, at 1479-80.
150. Id. at 1451.
151. Id. at 1454, 1460-62.
152. Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old
Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REv. 1, 21-22 (1994).
153. Id. at 21.
154. Diver & Cohen, supra note 146, at 1457-58 (indicating that the
resulting market equilibrium would make meaningful health insurance
unaffordable).
2003]
94 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
scholars believe that if left unregulated, GS would eventually
undermine the rationale for insurance, because persons could
know their future medical expenses.
1 55
On the other hand, if the state permits employers and insur-
ance companies to discriminate based on genetic test results,
they will inevitably penalize minorities linked to inheritable dis-
eases and those born of or possessing moral or religious convic-
tions opposed to interfering with natural childbirth. Plaintiffs'
sole recourse would be under HIPA, the ADA, Title VII, and state
law. Some have argued that Title VII provides an adequate rem-
edy for prospective religious and racial employment discrimina-
tion, but this does not necessarily follow.
A plaintiff alleging racial discrimination related to his
genetic endowment might state a claim for relief,156 but not nec-
essarily a plaintiff averring religious discrimination. 157 For exam-
ple, a plaintiff born gen-natural because her parents felt strongly
about the matter may not state a claim that a job designed solely
for those with or without a particular genetic complement vio-
lates the employee's religious faith. Even a rule denying insur-
ance coverage to employees who chose to have gen-natural
children may not violate an employee's religious faith. Employ-
ees may request a religious accommodation, but employers must
incur no more than "de minimis cost" to satisfy it. 158 Further-
more, if an employee states a prima facie case of racial or relig-
ious discrimination, an employer may state a non-pretextual




156. To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title
VII, the complainant must allege the following: (1) that the plaintiff belongs to
a class protected by Title VII; (2) that the plaintiff was qualified for the position
at issue; (3) that the defendant made an adverse employment decision despite
the plaintiff's qualifications; and (4) that the plaintiff was replaced with a per-
son not a member of the protected class. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
157. To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination under
Title VII, the complainant must allege the following: (1) a sincerely held relig-
ious belief that prohibits compliance with an employment requirement; (2) the
employee informed his employer of this religious belief putting the employer
on notice; and (3) the employee was subject to discharge, discrimination, disci-
pline, or other adverse treatment as a result of noncompliance. See Heller v.
EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Pyro Mining, 827
F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987); Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d
476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Turpen v. Mo.-Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 736 F.2d
1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984)).
158. HelMer, 8 F.3d at 1440.
159. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-04.
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2. Reproductive Rights
a. Abortion Rights
The information GS will unveil is, in Professor Andrews'
words, "powerful information," capable of dramatically
impacting the behavior of parents, their children, extended fam-
ily, and, as we have seen, employers and insurers. Genetic test
results may affect one's personal relationships, leading some to
withdraw from family, society, and long-term commitments.
According to surveys, both genders (although primarily men)
would alter their marriage plans if they learned their fianc6 car-
ried a recessive genetic disorder. 6 ' Other couples would decide
on ARTs, HC, or adoption. 6
In general, at least a ten-year "therapeutic gap" exists
between the discovery of genes linked to inherited disease and
the prospect of treating them genetically. 62 Only a few condi-
tions like phenylketonuria are treatable. 6 ' Accordingly, for now,
most parents who learn that their embryo or fetus may have an
inheritable disease have the option of bearing the child or abort-
ing. Likewise, children and adults who learn that they have an
inheritable disease may not have any recourse.
Consequently, scholars worry that women may delay fetal-
mother bonding until they learn of GS test results, potentially
damaging child development.'6 4 Likewise, children and adults
who learn of untreatable genetic disorders may suffer severe
depression, dramatically modify their lifestyles and educational
and vocational choices, or harm themselves.16 The suicide rate
is four times higher among persons with Huntington's Disease
than among the general population.166
For this reason, many advisory boards have begun recom-
mending against pre-symptomatic testing for certain diseases
until therapies exist.'6 7 Likewise, the EC permits GS "only for
health purposes or for scientific research linked to health pur-
160. Andrews, supra note 69, at 979.
161. See, e.g., Couple Wants to Have Baby Using Human Cloning; Interview with
Erin Runnion (CNN television broadcast Aug. 12, 2002), available at http://www.
cnn.com/Transcripts/0208/12/cct.00.html (on file with the Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter Couple Wants Clone].
162. Smith, supra note 69, at 726.
163. Andrews, supra note 69, at 972.
164. Id. at 980-81.
165. Id. at 980; Shepherd, supra note 132, at 800-02.
166. Andrews, supra note 69, at 976.
167. Id. at 984, 991 n.121 (the Institute of Medicine Committee on Assess-
ing Genetic Risks); Mary Z. Pelias & Susan H. Blanton, Genetic Testing in Children
and Adolescents: Parental Authority, The Rights of Children, and Duties of Geneticists, 3
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poses, and subject to appropriate genetic counselling." '68 Some
would import this idea by, for example, placing a moratorium on
pre-symptomatic testing for conditions lacking any therapy, but
one U.S. district court has held that parents have a reproductive
right to genetic test results as a corollary of the right to abort.'69
An even more controversial proposal that some, besides
those generally opposed to abortion favor, would limit the ability
of women to abort children for adult-onset disorders, discrimina-
tory reasons, and so-called "trivial" reasons like hair and eye
color.17° In general, positive test results from GS indicate merely
an increased probability that a child will develop a disease; there-
fore, parents open to abortion on the basis of test results will
inevitably have to wrestle with uncertainty about whether a dis-
ease will in fact be manifested and the extent of its manifesta-
tion. 71 Some parents will also have to take into account the
interests of their children in living normal lives until well into
their adulthood, because GS will occasionally reveal inheritable
diseases that are adult-onset in character like Huntington's or
Alzheimer's Disease.172 Some would outlaw abortion in these cir-
cumstances, as they would disapprove of its use as a gender selec-
tion tool in China and India. 7 ' This would require a
modification of prevailing reproductive rights law.
174
Another controversial proposal some recommend is publicly
mandating GS to detect particular genetic abnormalities. Five
states already require examination of the blood of newborns for
treatable genetic disorders like phenylketonuria and congenital
hypothyroidism.' 75 Forty other states require medical providers
U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 525, 527-28 (1996) (Huntington Disease
researchers).
168. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 134, art.
12.
169. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
170. Robertson, supra note 142, at 444-45 (discussing, but rejecting this
proposal).
171. Smith, supra note 69, at 746; see, e.g., Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med.
Ctr., 2002 WL 31895671 (Utah 2002) (parents informed of 85% chance their
would-be child would be born with Down Syndrome but advised that the tests
often result in false positives and, thus, not to worry). Lee Silver predicts
women in the future will produce multiple embryos, then screen and abort or
modify those they consider disadvantageous. LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN:
CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD 233-47 (1997).
172. Andrews, supra note 69, at 976 (on Huntington's Disease).
173. See Erik Eckholm, Desire for Sons Drives Use of Prenatal Scans in China,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2002, at A3.
174. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
175. ANDREWS, supra note 141, at 238.
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to offer newborn screening to parents, which they may decline in
writing.'76 These tests are for treatable and untreatable condi-
tions like Duchenne muscular dystrophy.1"
As GS improves and treatment becomes possible, legislators
will be tempted to mandate prenatal GS in more circumstances
without opt-outs. Professor Robertson contends there may be no
reproductive right to oppose this.17 Professor Andrews dis-
agrees and would also assert a Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 179 Consistent with this, one
lower federal court has held that the state may not mandate GS
without a compelling interest pursued in the least restrictive
manner. 180
Although a state may claim that it has a compelling interest
in furthering the birth of healthy children or saving money by
discouraging the birth of children with genetic disorders, Profes-
sor Andrews argues that saving money has never been deemed a
sufficient policy basis to override fundamental rights and prena-
tal GS does not further the birth of healthy children because
treatment for most genetic disorders is not available.' Instead,
mandatory GS encourages abortion and spurs social condemna-
tion of those who would continue pregnancies of fetuses with
inherited diseases.1 8 2 In this respect, it is similar to the so-called
"negative eugenics" policies liberal democracies have now uni-
formly rejected.
176. Id.; see also Shepherd, supra note 132, at 775. In reality, few health-
care providers advise parents of their waiver right, so testing is de facto
mandatory in most jurisdictions. Andrews, supra note 69, at 972, 1003.
177. Andrews, supra note 69, at 972.
178. Robertson, supra note 142, at 471.
179. Andrews, supra note 69, at 997-98. Recent cases involving Cesarean
sections have recognized a woman's right to refuse medical procedures during
pregnancy, but distinguished in dicta less substantial invasions of the body like
drawing blood. Id. at 998-1001. Ordinarily, mandatory blood testing is consid-
ered a search and seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment balancing test
weighing the nature and quality of the intrusion against the strength of the
state's interest. Accordingly, mandatory HIV testing of incarcerated individuals
without a warrant is unconstitutional, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
771-72 (1966), as is mandatory HIV testing of state employees working with
developmentally disabled clients, see Glover v. E. Neb. Cmty. Office of Retarda-
tion, 867 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1989).
180. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
181. Andrews, supra note 69, at 1002.
182. Id. at 981-82, 1002 (noting that women have already been criticized
for continuing pregnancies, for instance, when a radio talk show host learned
that a television anchorwoman affected with ectrodactyly, a mild genetic condi-
tion which fused the bones in her hand, decided to continue a pregnancy of a
fetus diagnosed with the same condition).
2003]
98 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
b. Negative Eugenics
Mendel's work in the late 1860s and social Darwinism led Sir
Francis Galton to coin the word "eugenics" from its Greek roots
meaning "good in birth." ' He hoped to improve the human
hereditary endowment by encouraging the ablest and healthiest
people to have more children, so-called "positive eugenics," but
preventing breeding, or "negative eugenics," proved easier.
During the 1920s, agencies like the American Eugenics
Records Office (ERO) sprouted across the industrialized world
to share the eugenic message. 184 At least twenty-eight states,
besides Nazi Germany, borrowed liberally from the ERO's Model
Eugenical Sterilization Law (Model Law), which authorized ster-
ilization of those maintained at public expense, particularly the
"feebleminded, insane, criminalistic, epileptic, inebriate, dis-
eased, blind, deaf, deformed, and dependent," including
"orphans, ne'er-do-wells, tramps, the homeless and paupers. " s5
States also passed antimiscegenation statutes prohibiting inter-
ethnic marriage and restrictive immigration laws discouraging
immigration from genetically less desirable regions.186
The political and scientific proponents of Virginia's Model
Law allegedly conspired with defense counsel before passage to
ensure it would survive a test case against Carrie Buck, a 17-year-
183. Mary Kay Pelias & Nathan J. Markward, The Human Genome in the
Public View: Genetics, Geneticists, and Eugenics, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 827, 844
(2001).
184. See Stephanie Hyatt, A Shared History of Shame: Sweden's Four-Decade
Policy of Forced Sterilization and the Eugenics Movement in the United States, 8 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 475, 481 (1998).
185. In 1907, Indiana passed the first eugenic sterilization law to prevent
"defective" individuals from reproducing amongst themselves and reduce the
social burden. Connecticut was next. The ERO developed the Model Law to
address the infirmities courts used to strike this early legislation. See HARRY
LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 446-51 (1922);
Pelias & Markward, supra note 183, at 845-46; Hyatt, supra note 184, at 490
(twenty-seven states). Nazi Germany adapted and passed the Model Law in
1933. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v.
Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 31 n.6 (1985) [hereinafter Lombardo I] (Hitler's
sterilization law was based on the Model Law); Paul Lombardo, Eugenic Steriliza-
tion Laws, at http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/essay8text.htmi
(last accessed Nov. 17, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy).
186. Pelias & Markward, supra note 183, at 846. The Immigration Restric-
tion Act of 1924 was a conscious effort to prevent the immigration of southern
and eastern Europeans.
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old unwed mother and daughter of an asylum resident. 1 7
Expert witnesses testified that Carrie had "a record during life of
immorality, prostitution, and untruthfulness," that the Buck fam-
ily belonged to a "shiftless, ignorant, and worthless class of anti-
social whites," and that Carrie's seven-month-old child had
below-average intelligence and was "not quite normal."' 8 Sadly,
the U.S. Supreme Court agreed:
Carrie Buck 'is the probable potential parent of socially
inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that she may be
sexually sterilized without detriment to her general health
and that her welfare and that of society will be promoted
by her sterilization . . . .' It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are
enough. 189
Twelve years later (December 31, 1939), the ERO closed its
doors for good as the extent of Nazi atrocities became evident.
Although never expressly overturning Buck, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck a mandatory sterilization policy in 1942, finding no
basis for inferring the inheritability of a criminal trait, 9 ' and
overturned Virginia's antimiscegenation statute in 1967."l In a
few more decades the U.S. government ceased sterilizing persons
confined to mental institutions.'9 2 Mandating prenatal GS would
reverse this policy consensus by once again coercing vulnerable
populations to forego reproduction and to abort when no ther-
apy for an inheritable disease exists or none is affordable.
187. Lombardo I, supra note 185, at 33, 48-55 (citing Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927)). Carrie's foster parents cooperated because they said they
could not afford her. Id. at 54.
188. Hyatt, supra note 184, at 491-92; Lombardo I, supra note 185, at
51-52. In reality, Carrie's daughter who lived barely eight years did well in
school, once earning a spot on her school Honor Roll. Id. at 61.
189. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
190. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
191. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 1 (1967) (overturning the Virginia
Racial Integrity Act).
192. In the interim, an estimated 60,000 Americans were sterilized with-
out their consent or the consent of a family member. Hyatt, supra note 184, at
488; Lombardo I, supra note 185, at 31. Sterilization campaigns aimed at poor
women continue in some parts of the world. See Mass Sterilization Scandal Shocks
Peru, BBC NEws, July 24, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ameri-
cas/2148793.stm (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
2003]
100 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
B. Legal Regimes HC Implicates
The next biotechnological innovation behind GS on the
innovation curve is HC. The issues it raises depend on the type
and purpose of HC: (1) parthenogenesis or SCNT and (2) repro-
ductive cloning or research cloning. A developing consensus
suggests that HC through parthenogenesis is acceptable, 9 '
reproductive cloning is never acceptable, but research cloning
may be acceptable. Rarely has this consensus confronted key
legal obstacles discussed below.
1. Reproductive Rights
a. Reproductive Cloning
A number of commentators argue that HC is a reproductive
liberty.194 The predominant international response is to the con-
trary. The General Conference has declared human reproduc-
tive cloning contrary to human dignity.195 The Council of
Europe has precluded "[t]he creation of human embryos for
research purposes." '196 Its Protocol on Cloning Human Beings
adds, "[a] ny intervention seeking to create a human being genet-
ically identical to another human being, whether living or dead,
is prohibited."'9 7 The definition of "human being" is unstated,
but widely interpreted to be a born person.198
193. No pending federal bill proposes to ban cloning through partheno-
genesis, not even the most restrictive anti-cloning bill. See Human Cloning Pro-
hibition Act of 2001, S. 1899, 107th Cong. (2001) (formerly Human Cloning
Prohibition Act of 2001, S. 790, 107th Cong. (2001)); Human Cloning Prohibi-
tion Act of 2001, H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001).
194. Robertson on Cloning, supra note 2, at 1430, 1442-46; Wu, supra
note 90, at 1509.
195. U.N. ESCO, supra note 134, art. 11.
196. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 134, art.
18(2).
197. Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biol-
ogy and Medicine on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, Council of
Europe, art. 1(1), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/168.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 1998) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal
of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
198. Explanatory Report on the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings 6 ("In con-
formity with the approach followed in the preparation of the Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine, it was decided to leave it to domestic law to
define the scope of the expression 'human being' for the purposes of the appli-
cation of the present Protocol."), available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en/Reports/Html/168.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2002) (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
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Nevertheless, American scholars who consider HC and GE
reproductive rights rely in the former instance upon the notion
that reproduction by any means is constitutionally protected and,
in the latter instance, upon the close connection between the
expected characteristics of offspring and the decision whether or
not to reproduce. 99 The first argument stems from cases with
holdings far removed from the sweeping, non-binding dicta they
cite for the proposition that the rights to conceive and to raise
one's children are "essential ,' 200 "fundamental, "201 "basic civil
rights of man,"2 2 "[rlights far more precious . . .than property
rights," 20 and "among the most private and sensitive" rights.
20 4
To constitute a fundamental right, reproductive cloning
must be deemed "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such
that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacri-
ficed" and, objectively speaking, "deeply rooted in this nation's
history and tradition. 20 5 The Supreme Court has struggled to
articulate how to spot such a tradition. 2 6 The "originalist" per-
spective advocated by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas,
examines "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified. 20 7 If this standard was applied to a ban on implanting
clones, the ban would survive, because no American tradition of
HC exists. Indeed, a minority of states has outlawed it. 20 8
199. Robertson on Cloning, supra note 2, at 1425-29; Samuel A. Gun-
sburg, Note, Frozen Life's Dominion: Extending Reproductive Autonomy Rights to In
Vitro Fertilization, 65 FoRDHAm L. REv. 2205 (1997). Professor Robertson argues
cloning is only procreative "if the genome that is cloned is that of the person
herself or of an embryo, fetus, or child that has been created from her
gametes." Robertson, supra note 2, at 1438.
200. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (The rights to conceive and
to raise one's children have been deemed "essential.").
201. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.").
202. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("basic civil rights of
man").
203. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) ("[r]ights far more pre-
cious .. .than property rights").
204. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (decision
whether or not to bear or beget a child is fundamental to individual auton-
omy); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
205. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
206. See Gunsburg, supra note 199, at 2222-23.
207. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
208. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24,185-89 (Deering 2000) (mor-
atorium on reproductive cloning sunsets on Jan. 1, 2003); Human Cloning Pro-
20031
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However, the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court has thus
far rejected the originalist perspective on fundamental rights and
indicated a willingness to examine whether a specific liberty
interest is "close enough" to any interest previously deemed pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 2°9 Courts held abortion
and receipt of contraception a fundamental right, despite a wide-
spread and longstanding American tradition restricting both.2 10
Reproductive rights scholars contend assisted reproductive tech-
hibition Act, Iowa Senate File 2118 (to be codified at IowA CODE §§ 707B.1-.4)
(enacted Apr. 26, 2002) (ban on research and reproductive cloning); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1299.36-.36.6 (West 1999) (ban on human cloning for the pur-
pose of or to implant the clone to initiate a pregnancy); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 333.16,274 (2000) (prohibiting a health care licensee from engaging in
research cloning); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-16.4-2 to -4 (2000) (moratorium on
reproductive cloning); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-162.21 to -.22 (Michie 2001) (ban
on research and reproductive cloning); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 34-14-16
to -20 (Michie 2002) (ban on non-therapeutic research on human embryos).
209. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
847 (1992) (expressly rejecting Justice Scalia's originalist formula in note 6 of
Michael H.). The views ofJustice O'Connor are particularly important, because,
to a significant extent, she has shaped substantive due process law since Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 209 n.4 (1986). See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132
(O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., concurring in part) (refusing to join note 6 on
the grounds it is inconsistent with, among other cases, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) ("On occasion
the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at
levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific level' available."); id. at
133 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (assuming a fundamental right for
purposes of the case); id. at 139-40 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissent-
ing) (applying a looser standard to identify a deeply rooted tradition: "If we had
looked to tradition with such specificity in past cases, many a decision would
have reached a different result.") (citing, inter alia, Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, Gris-
wold, 381 U.S. 479, and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)); see also Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (1997) ("[W]e have required in substantive-
due-process cases a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest."); id. at 736, 741, 750 (O'Connor, J, concurring) (implying the Justice
might have found a right to assisted suicide where a person was experiencing
great suffering).
210. See Paul B. Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason
in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 15 (1993).
At the time Roe was decided, thirty States allowed abortion only to save
the life of the mother; two States and the District of Columbia allowed
abortion to save the life or preserve the health of the mother; one
State allowed abortion to save the mother's life or to terminate a preg-
nancy resulting from rape; thirteen States had adopted Section 230.3
of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code or some variant
thereof allowing abortion under specified circumstances; and four
States allowed abortion on demand, but set limits in terms of the age
of the fetus. No State allowed unrestricted abortion throughout preg-
nancy, as Roe effectively does.
Id. at 26-27.
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nology (ART) and HC using one's own DNA is "close enough" to
coital reproduction to be treated similarly. 21' Although no court
has reviewed a woman's right to clone, one lower federal court
has found and other courts have stated in dicta that a couple has
a right to reproduce under federal and state law through ART,
2 12
which has been widely practiced in the United States for roughly
two decades.
Of course, HC is distinguishable from ART, because (1) HC
does not involve the joining of gametes, (2) the medical and psy-
chological risks to the embryo of the two procedures are very dif-
ferent, and (3) the consequences for the traditional family
structure are not the same. Reproductive rights scholars contend
all of these risks can be addressed with narrower means than a
ban on HC (e.g., through oversight by hospital Institutional
Review Boards (IRBs)) and by preventing the implantation of
clones a couple does not intend to rear or banning the implanta-
tion of the clone of a parent or oneself.
213
Opponents of a ban on implanting human clones probably
could not mount a successful facial challenge to the ban on this
basis, 21 4 but a woman who could not produce coitally, cloned
211. See generally Robertson on Cloning, supra note 2; Wu, supra note 90.
212. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (overturning
Illinois provision banning non-therapeutic research on fetuses interpreted by
the court to include embryos because it was impermissibly vague and infringed
upon a woman's fundamental right to privacy);J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J.
2001); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600-02 (Tenn. 1992) (stating in the con-
text of a contest over the disposition of embryos created with ART, "the right of
procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance-the
right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation."); see also Goodwin v.
Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of prisoner's writ of
habeas corpus asserting that the Bureau of Prison's refusal to allow him to pro-
vide semen to his wife for the purpose of artificially inseminating her violated
his constitutional right of procreation; court said the regulation was "reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests" while assuming without deciding
that he had an alleged fundamental procreation right); Cameron v. Board of
Educ. of Hillsboro, Ohio, 795 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (denying
employer's motion for summary judgment on teacher's complaint for sexual
discrimination on the grounds that her contract was not renewed because she
conceived a child using artificial insemination. "A woman has a constitutional
privacy right to control her reproductive functions. Consequently, a woman
possesses the right to become pregnant by artificial insemination."); In re Baby
M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (fundamental right of procreating, while includ-
ing the right to use artificial insemination, did not extend to include a right of
custody of the biologically related child).
213. Robertson on Cloning, supra note 2, at 1411, 1430, 1439, 1442-46,
1451; Wu, supra note 90, at 1509.
214. A successful facial challenge would require the plaintiff to establish
"'no set of circumstances.., under which the Act would be valid.'" Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quot-
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herself, and sought to implant and rear the human clone could
challenge it on an as-applied basis.215 Her claim could draw sym-
pathy from not only the pro-choice community, but also those in
the pro-life community interested in "rescuing" human clones
from the primary alternative left by a ban on implanting them:
terminating them.
In contrast to a ban on implanting human clones, a ban on
creating them is similar to laws precluding certain types of sexual
acts like incest, adultery, and sodomy, 21 6 as well as illicit relation-
ships precedent to reproduction like bigamy, polygamy, and
prostitution. 217 Although government may not prohibit the birth
ing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)). No significant reproductive
rights victory has been achieved on the basis of a facial attack.
215. See, e.g., Couple Wants Clone, supra note 161.
216. See, e.g., State v. Benson, 612 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stat-
ute prohibiting incest constitutional); State v. Buck, 757 P.2d 861 (Or. App.
1988); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 n.4 (1986) (laws against sodomy
constitutional); State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d 839 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983). "Various
justices have . . .expressed the view that other extra-marital sexual crimes are
valid and enforceable." Roe v. Butterworth, 958 F. Supp. 1569, 1578 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (citing, inter alia, Carey v. Population Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(White, J., concurring) ("I do not regard the opinion, however, as declaring
unconstitutional any state law forbidding extramarital sexual relations."), Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("The
State of Connecticut does have statutes, the constitutionality of which is beyond
doubt, which prohibit adultery and fornication."); id. at 505 (White, J., concur-
ring) ("the State's policy against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual rela-
tionships . . . [is] concededly a permissible and legitimate legislative goal.");
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I would not
suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from
criminal enquiry, however privately practiced.")); see also Andrews, supra note
91, at 669.
217. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (White, J., dis-
senting) ("[T]he State clearly has the authority to criminalize prostitution and
obscene behavior."); id. at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 584 (Souter, J.,
concurring); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15 (1973) ("Stat-
utes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual's freedom to associate,
but few today seriously claim such statutes violate the First Amendment or any
other constitutional provision."); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)
("There is unquestionably a control in the states over the morals of their citi-
zens, and, it may be admitted, it extends to making prostitution a crime."); Roe
II v. Butterworth, 958 F. Supp. at 1578 (finding prostitution not a fundamental
reproductive right); see also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)
(upholding conviction of Mormon under the Mann Act for transporting one of
plural wives across state lines for immoral purposes); Late Corp. of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890) (uphold-
ing the Edmonds Act and describing polygamy as "a crime against the laws, and
abhorrent to the sentiments and feelings of the civilized world"); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1890) (bigamy and polygamy "tend to destroy
the purity of the marriage relation .... Few crimes are more pernicious to the
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of babies created despite these laws, courts have not found any
fundamental right to engage in these reproductive acts or to
enter into these relationships. Likewise, whether or not a funda-
mental right to implant a clone exists, it is safe to assume the
Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude the government from
prohibiting altogether creation of human clones. A ban on creat-
ing clones would be far less invasive of privacy than a ban on
implanting them, and target researchers' activities, rather than
women and clones.218
Furthermore, the state has many more compelling interests
in a ban on creating clones, such as (1) upholding standard
human subject experimentation rules; (2) preventing the crea-
tion of life solely to cannibalize it; (3) preserving human genetic
patrimony and diversity; (4) prohibiting eugenics; and (5)
preventing the exploitation of women's reproductive capacity.
Concerning the latter point, one estimate indicates that it will
take 800 million eggs to experimentally treat 16 million diabetics
in the United States, never mind the multitude of other diseases
best interests of society and receive more general or more deserved punish-
ment."); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885) (assuming the constitutionality
of the Edmonds Act denying voting rights and the right to hold office to prac-
ticing polygamists and denying the right to sit on juries to both practitioners
and believers in polygamy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
(upholding conviction of polygamist despite striking of polygamistjurors and of
defense that his religion required polygamy).
218. Indeed, pending legislation, read literally, would authorize the state
to require a woman to abort a human clone implanted in violation of the bill.
The Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2002, S.
1893, 107th Cong. § 301(d) (3) (2002), requires forfeiture of any "property"
derived from or used to commit a violation or attempted violation of § 301(b).
Section 301 (b) renders illegal implanting or attempting to implant the "prod-
uct of nuclear transplantation" into a uterus or the functional equivalent of a
uterus. The product of nuclear transplantation, as defined in § 301 (a) (3), is a
cloned human embryo. To the extent the cloned embryo is not a human
being, it must be "property" used to commit a violation of § 301(b) and, there-
fore, subject to forfeiture under § 301 (d) (3). Accord Statement of DanielJ Bryant,
Assist. Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, Before the U.S. House of Representa-
tives Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy
and Human Resources, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter DOJ Statement]. The
only way for the state forcibly to take a cloned embryo actually implanted in a
woman is to compel her to abort it, contrary to reproductive liberty, which
implies the right to carry a fetus to term. See Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ.) (citing Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County, Ala., 880 F.2d
305, 311 (11th Cir. 1989) (relying upon Roe and concluding that government
officials violate the U.S. Constitution by coercing a minor to have an abor-
tion)); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating a criminal stat-
ute that provided for the mandatory sterilization of those who committed
certain types of felonies).
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advocates of cloning hope to cure.219 The only potential alterna-
tive is to implant human DNA in cow or pig eggs and, thus, cre-
ate chimera.
Professor Leon Kass has argued persuasively that only a total
ban on cloning is enforceable, because, once human clones exist
in laboratories and ART clinics, it will be virtually impossible to
control what is done with them.22° The Department of Justice
(DOJ) recently testified that it would have to begin scrutinizing
ART clinics, laboratories and, it should be added, uteruses to
attempt to distinguish cloned human embryos that are or may be
implanted from identical non-cloned embryos.221 DOJ insists
that even an officer standing next to a researcher violating an
implantation ban would not detect it. 22 2 Establishing mens rea to
engage in reproductive cloning would also prove problematic.
223
Therefore, a ban solely on reproductive cloning would probably
not achieve any asserted compelling state interest.
22 4
b. Research Cloning
Unlike reproductive cloning, research cloning arguably has
nothing to do with reproductive liberty for the simple reason that
it never leads to implantation and birth. On the other hand,
most abortion rights law suggests that the state possesses a suffi-
cient interest in the ex vivo living human embryo to justify
prohibiting persons from maltreating it. For example, Roe
acknowledged that the State of Texas possessed an important
and legitimate interest in protecting potential life, "separate and
distinct" from the interest in protecting the health of the
mother.225 The interest Roe recognized commenced at viability,
whereas the interest the Casey plurality recognized arose at
conception.226
219. Council for Biotechnology Policy, Human Cloning and the "Egg
Dearth" Where Will They Get the Eggs?, BIoTEcH BULL. #10 (Mar. 14, 2002) (on file
with author).
220. Statement of Leon R. Kass, supra note 4.
221. DOJStatement, supra note 218.
222. Id.
223. Id. ("In the absence of a confession, it would be exceedingly difficult
for law enforcement authorities to establish that those performing a clonal
implantation did so with the requisite mens rea at the time the procedure was
performed, even if the ultimate result is the birth of a cloned human being.").
224. In contrast, DOJ has testified and Professor Kass agreed that a ban
on creating clones is enforceable and capable of achieving its objective. Id.;
Statement of Leon R. Kass, supra note 4.
225. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
226. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876
(1992) ("[T]here is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout preg-
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Accordingly, federal law prohibits the use of federal funds
for "research in which embryos are destroyed, discarded, or
knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that
allowed for research on fetuses in utero.' ' 22 7 Likewise, states have
adopted legislation banning or regulating embryonic
research.22 Additionally, courts have upheld fetal manslaughter
statutes even for lack of evidence the fetus was viable. 29
Responding to one convict's plea to overturn his conviction
under such a law, the Sixth Circuit stated that petitioner "miscon-
ceives the nature of the right established in Rod'; it vindicated a
nancy."). But see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (preceding Casey
and finding the state's interest in living human embryos created through ART
too slight-even slighter than the state's interest in prohibiting abortion during
the first trimester-to justify infringing the alleged reproductive right of gam-
ete providers to decide the fate of the embryos).
227. This language has been included in every HHS appropriations bill
since 1995. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 510 (2000); Omnibus Bill, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 510 (1999); Omni-
bus Bill, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 511, 112 Stat. 2681-386 (1998); Labor/HHS/
Education Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-78, § 513, 111 Stat. 1517 (1997);
Omnibus Bill, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 512, 110 Stat. 3009-270 (1996); Balanced
Budget Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-99, § 128, 110 Stat. 34 (1996). In
2001, Congress deemed this provision consistent with President Bush's policy of
permitting the federal funding of research on allegedly roughly 70 lines of stem
cells already derived from living human embryos. See H.R. REP. No. 107-229,
§ 510 (2001).
228. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(6) (West 1998) (banning the use
of any live fetus "for any type of scientific, research, laboratory, or other kind of
experimentation"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2000) (prohibiting the
destruction of any in vitro fertilized human ovum); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1598 (West 1992) (stating that the use of intrauterine and extra-uterine
human fetuses or products of conception cannot be used for scientific or any
form of experimentation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 2001)
(prohibiting research on embryos if the research will substantially jeopardize
the life or health of the embryo); MINN. STAT. § 145.422 (1998) (stating that
anyone who uses a living human conceptus for experimentation that is not
harmless to the embryo is guilty of a gross misdemeanor); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-
9A-3 (Michie 2000) (stating "[n]o fetus shall be involved as a subject in any
clinical research activity unless the purpose of the activity is to meet the health
needs of the particular fetus" and that "the fetus will be placed at risk only to
the minimum extent necessary to meet such needs or no significant risk to the
fetus is imposed by the research activity"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3216 (2000)
(stating that "any person who knowingly performs any type of non-therapeutic
experimentation or non-therapeutic medical procedure" upon an unborn child
is guilty of a third degree felony, and defining "non-therapeutic" as "that which
is not intended to preserve the life or health of the child upon whom it is
performed").
229. See, e.g., Coleman v. DeWitt, 282 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. den'd.,
122 S.Ct. 2379 (2002) (rejecting petitioner's plea to overturn his conviction for
manslaughter for causing his baby to miscarry after kicking his girlfriend in the
abdomen for lack of evidence it was viable).
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woman's interest in self-determination while recognizing "that
the state had important interests in protecting fetal life."2 '0
Likewise, Tennessee's Supreme Court found that even fro-
zen human embryos deserve "special respect" and, therefore,
some interim level of protection between persons and prop-
erty. 2 ' The metaphors of "person" or "property" may be inade-
quate for the purpose of biotechnological regulation where the
ex vivo subject is not mere tissue, but living; not another species,
but human; not self-conscious, but possessing the entire genetic
code of an adult person. "[A]lthough fetuses and embryos may
not be persons in the full sense, they are still entitled to certain
kinds of respect and moral regard" more important than "mere
things. '23 2 Pursuant to the special respect paradigm, the state
has the authority to preclude or regulate research cloning with-
out impacting a woman's right to choose.
2. First Amendment
The First Amendment is another legal regime relevant to
biotechnology. Proponents of HC contend that scientists have a
free speech and Fourteenth Amendment right to engage in sci-
entific inquiry and cloners have a Free Speech and Free Exercise
right to express themselves. 2 They argue that research is an
essential precondition to dissemination of scientific ideas; there-
fore, "it should have the same constitutional status as dissemina-
tion of scientific information"; otherwise, "government could
control access to ideas by locating restraints at the point where
the information sought to be disseminated is developed or
obtained. "234
230. Id. at 912-14.
231. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. Concerning Davis, ProfessorJohn Robert-
son remarked, "[O]ne may reject the right-to-life position that early embryos
are themselves persons . . . and still agree that early embryos deserve 'special
respect'. . . ." John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early
Embryos, 76 VA. L. REv. 437, 446-47 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson on Early
Embryos]; see also John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty:
The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 972-75 (1986)
[hereinafter Robertson on New Reproduction].
232. Kayhan Parsi, Metaphorical Imagination: The Moral and Legal Status of
Fetuses and Embryos, 4 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE L. 703, 784-85 (1999).
233. See, e.g., Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of
Human Cloning, 42 Amiz. L. REv. 647, 696 (2000);John A. Robertson, The Law of
Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484 (1979) [hereinafter Robertson
on IRBs]; John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A Constitutional
Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203 (1977) [hereinafter Robertson on Right to
Research].
234. Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at 503.
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Expressive conduct warrants First Amendment protection
only if (1) the conduct is intended to convey a particularized
message and (2) there is a "great" likelihood that "the message
will be understood by those who view[ ] it."' 2 5 Cases establishing
this proposition in the 1960s and 1970s involved flag burning,
registration card burning, and black armbands.236 Biotechnol-
ogical research may not meet this standard. Nevertheless, one
commentator declares that "[t]hrough experimentation, scien-
tists express their creativity and intellectuality in much the same
way that musicians express themselves through music or artists
express themselves through art. '2 7  Banning this research,
according to the scholar, would interfere with the conveyance of
a message "in the same way as would a law which banned impres-
sionistic painting or rap music."
238
One of the first American couples pursuing cloning says it
wants to "tell the world" cloning is safe and acceptable. 239 The
couple adds, "God really wants us to do [it] .-240 Cults organizing
around this theme include the church of Prometheus, church of
conscious evolution, and Raelians. 241  Therefore, American
courts will likely decide arguments for human cloning premised
235. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (displaying American
flag with peace symbol superimposed was protected by First Amendment
because it was essentially a form of expression).
236. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (invalidating Flag
Protection Act of 1989, which made it a crime for any person knowingly to
mutilate, deface, physically defile, burn, maintain on the floor or ground, or
trample upon any flag of the United States); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (overturning conviction of person under Texas flag desecration statute
who burned an American flag as part of a political demonstration protesting
the policies of the Reagan Administration); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (invaliding suspensions of three public school
students who wore black armbands to school to protest the government's policy
in Vietnam); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding indict-
ment of defendant on basis he "willfully and knowingly did multilate [sic],
destroy, and change by burning [his] Registration Certificate ....").
237. Foley, supra note 233, at 683 (adding that permitting creation of a
human clone, but not its implantation, according to this commentator, would
prevent the scientists from "performing a play one has written or singing a song
one has composed").
238. Id.
239. See Couple Wants Clone, supra note 161.
240. Id.
241. See The First Sovereign Transhuman and Neo-Eugenic Libertarian Religious
State, (declaring it is the church of Prometheus' "aim to create a [genetically]
enhanced race that will ... become a new, superior species. ... " And stating,
"We seek to bring ourselves closer to Godhood. Through [eugenics] and other
forms of ... self-improvement, [we will] bring about higher civilization, higher
creativity, higher consciousness to the Universe."), at http://wvw.prometheism.
net (last visited Nov. 17, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
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on free speech; free exercise; and so-called "hybrid rights"
claims,242 incorporating free speech, free exercise, and parental
rights.
2 43
Generally applicable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of relig-
ious expression is permissible.244 Regulation of expressive con-
duct that is not viewpoint neutral or, in other words, subject
merely to neutral time, place and manner restrictions, must sat-
isfy strict scrutiny.245 In this event, a law proscribing cloning
would have to serve a compelling interest unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression in the least restrictive manner.246
One commentator urges that a ban on HC would not be content
neutral, because it would necessarily "emanate from fears con-
cerning the expressive content of cloning activity," and would
not be narrowly tailored because a ban merely on reproductive
cloning would do.24 7 If carried to its logical conclusion, this posi-
tion would treat as viewpoint discrimination any regulation serv-
ing the health and safety of human subjects, yet liberal
democracies have always both encouraged liberal scientific
inquiry and regulated a wide variety of medical research, includ-
ing, for example, human subject experimentation,248 gene trans-
fer research, 24 9 and fetal tissue research.
250
Ethics & Public Policy); Aaron Zitner, Clones, Free Love, and UFOs, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2002, at Al (concerning Raelians).
242. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 881 (1990) (holding that incidental infringements on religious expression
caused by neutral, generally applicable laws are subject merely to rational
review, unless the infringements impact "hybrid rights"-such as hybrid free
exercise-free speech rights-or are part of a generalized system of exceptions).
243. Andrews on Cloning, supra note 91, at 648; Liza Mundy, A World of
Their Own; In the Eyes of His Parents, If Gauvin Hughes McCullough Turns Out to be
Deaf That will be Just Perfect, WASH. PosT, Mar. 31, 2002, at W22; see also Cole-
man, supra note 33, at 160 ("Another argument for a parental right to geneti-
cally design their children focuses on First Amendment considerations: The
very essence of a free society lies in the liberty of each individual citizen to
develop in the direction that she pleases. [GE] advances the prospects for self
actualization of its recipients.").
244. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
245. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); see also Rosen-
berger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (citing
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)) ("When government targets not
subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation
of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.").
246. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; see also Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995).
247. Foley, supra note 233, at 683-85.
248. See infra Part II(B) (3) (b).
249. See supra Part I(B) (3) (a).
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Professor Robertson would distinguish these regulations
concerning research methods from limitations on a scientist's
ability to select a research topic. He would allow the former, but
protect absolutely the latter and, thus, disallow any ban on
acquiring scientific knowledge concerning HC.25  Case law does
not necessarily support this distinction. To be sure, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated in dicta in Meyer v. Nebraska, that Four-
teenth Amendment liberty "denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right . . . to acquire useful knowledge
.... "252 Although it is conceivable a court could use this as a
basis to expand Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, no court
has yet identified a deeply rooted liberty interest in scientific
inquiry, never mind HC or GE. On the other hand, courts have
held that there is no fundamental right of scientific inquiry to
experiment on human fetuses.253
Once more, to the extent biotechnological research is sym-
bolic speech, it could be characterized solely as commercial
speech subject to intermediate scrutiny.254  Whereas the
Supreme Court has implied that the conduct of science is gener-
ally not commercial,2 5 some of the initial efforts to engage in
250. See National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 § 112, 42
U.S.C. § 289g-2(a) (1994) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human fetal tissue for valuable con-
sideration if the transfer affects interstate commerce."); 42 U.S.C. § 289g
(Research on nonviable human fetuses is banned, unless it poses "no added risk
of suffering, injury or death to the fetus and the purpose of the research or
experimentation is the development of important biomedical knowledge that
cannot be obtained by other means."); 42 U.S.C. § 289g-l (b) (2) (A) (ii)
(Human fetal tissue may not be used if obtaining it alters the timing, method,
or procedure used to terminate pregnancy.).
251. Robertson on Cloning, supra note 2, at 1436-39; Robertson on IRBs,
supra note 233, at 506; Robertson on Right to Research, supra note 233, at
1204-09. He would also concede the government's ability to condition federal
funding for medical research as it chooses; for example, by precluding funding
for the purpose of destroying living human embryos. Robertson on IRBs, supra
note 233, at 507; Robertson on Right to Research, supra note 233, at 1208.
252. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added).
253. Andrews, supra note 91, at 663; see, e.g., Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp.
1302 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
254. A four-part test exists for determining the validity of restrictions on
commercial speech: (1) the content of the speech must concern lawful activities
and not be misleading; (2) the asserted governmental interest in regulating the
speech must be substantial; (3) the regulation must directly advance the
asserted governmental interest; and (4) the regulation must be no more exten-
sive than necessary to serve the asserted governmental interest. Central Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
255. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (Commercial speech is "speech which does no more than
propose a commercial transaction" such that it "is so removed from any exposi-
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reproductive cloning appear primarily for-profit.256 Even with
respect to research cloning, we shall see that biotechnological
inquiry is dominated by a close relationship between business
and the academy.25 7 It is so close that in many instances the
demands of Wall Street appear to govern biotechnological
research more than time-honored academic principles.25 s
3. Human Subject Experimentation Rules
Human subject medical experimentation was not widely
practiced or legally authorized prior to 1935.259 Therefore, lib-
eral democracies did not begin regulating it until after the
Nuremberg Trials. This section explores the legal regime that
resulted, which proponents of HC consider inapplicable to
genetically altered living human embryos.
a. International Codes
The atrocities that Nazis committed in World War II were
the genesis of human subject experimentation law. The Doctors'
tion of ideas and from truth, science, morality, and arts in general .. . that it
lacks all protection.").
256. See Bob LaMendola, Cloning Claims Spawn Skepticism and Outrage;
Scientists Question Company's Assertions, Credibility, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale
Fla.), Jan. 1, 2003, at IA (referencing Clonaid's cloning services including
human reproductive cloning for $200,000, preserving cells for future cloning
for $200 per year, and cloning pets for an undisclosed fee; those services are
advertised at Clonaid.com, http://www.clonaid.com/english/pages/services.
html (last visited Jan. 14, 2003) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy)).
257. See infra Part I1(B) (3) (b) at 40-41.
258. For example, Advanced Cell Technology, Inc. (ACT) announced in
November 2001 that it had cloned human beings, but the scientific community
concluded the claim was a spurious attempt to raise capital. See, e.g., Gina
Kolata & Andrew Pollack, A Breakthrough in Cloning? Perhaps, or Perhaps Not Yet,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at Al.
259. Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimenta-
tion, 19J. LEGAL MED. 157 (1998).
We recognize the fact that if the general practice of medicine and
surgery is to progress, there must be a certain amount of experimenta-
tion carried on; but such experiments must be done with the knowl-
edge and consent of the patient or those responsible for him, and
must not vary too radically from the accepted method of procedure.
Id. at 169 (citing Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.W.2d 762 (1935)). Only one case pre-
ceding the Nuremberg Code dealt with non-therapeutic human subject experi-
mentation and held that a fifteen-year-old minor, together with his parent,
could consent to a non-therapeutic skin graft benefiting the minor's cousin.
GeorgeJ. Annas, Mengele's Birthmark: The Nuremberg Code in United States Courts, 7
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'v 17, 22 (1991) (citing Bonner v. Moran, 126
F.2d 121, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941)).
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Trials after the War led to the Nuremberg Code, which prohib-
ited altogether human subject experimentation where (1) the
researcher knew the experiment could lead to death or disabling
injury; (2) the research was not based on sufficient animal stud-
ies; (3) the human subject had not given voluntary informed con-
sent; (4) the researcher could obtain the results another way; and
(5) the experiment allowed unnecessary suffering and injury.
26 °
Research cloning violates each of these criteria, some inevi-
tably. For example, it necessarily leads to the death of the
human subject (the embryo) and the subject cannot consent to
the procedure. Additionally, only a handful of generally unsuc-
cessful animal studies presently reveal that embryonic stem cells
can treat disease, whereas a number of studies involving adult
260. The Nuremberg Code states,
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential,
[and the human subject] should have legal capacity to give con-
sent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud,
deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint
or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and compre-
hension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to
enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision.
2. The experiment should be... unprocurable by other methods or
means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of
animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of
the disease ....
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unneces-
sary physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori rea-
son to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except,
perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental physicians
also serve as subjects.
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be
at liberty to bring the experiment to an end ....
10. [T]he scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the
experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause to believe, in the
exercise of the good faith, superior skill and careful judgment
required of him that a continuation of the experiment is likely to
result in injury, disability or death to the experimental subject.
NUREMBERG CODE (1949), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/nuremberg.php3
(on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); see also
United States v. Carl Brandt, II TRiLAs OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREM-
BERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 181-82
(1946-49).
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stem cells suggest they have the potential to achieve all of the
objectives of embryonic stem cell research.
261
The Code remains the "most complete and authoritative
statement of the law of informed consent to human experimen-
tation. ' 2 6 2 It is "part of international common law and may be
applied, in both civil and criminal cases, by state, federal and
municipal courts in the United States." 26' Although federal
courts have not found that it creates an implied right of action in
circumstances where adequate domestic remedies exist, 264 they
have found, contrary to claims of qualified immunity, a "clearly
established right" to bodily integrity in § 1983 litigation.265
However, a successor code of medical ethics exists. The
1964 Helsinki Declaration was promulgated in response to the
demand by researchers for a more "flexible" ethical standard to
facilitate bona fide (in contrast to Nazi) experimentation on
incompetent humans. 266 In 1954, the World Medical Association
(WMA) proposed approving experimentation on incompetent
human subjects with the consent of a person legally responsible
for the individual.267 Since amended, the Declaration now more
closely resembles the Code than ever.
Most importantly, the Declaration now expressly prohibits
proxy consent to human subject research if (1) the research is
not necessary to promote the health of the subject; (2) the
research can be performed on legally competent individuals; and
261. See Opportunities and Advanicements in Stem Cell Research: Hearing Before
the Gov't Reform Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Res., 107th
Cong. n.16 (2001) (statement of David Prentice and supplemental statement of
David Prentice).
262. GEORGE ANNAS ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HuMAN EXPERIMENTA-
TION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 21 (1977).
263. Id. at 21; accord Heinrich v. Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27, 42 (D. Mass.
1999) (citing In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 821 (S.D. Ohio
1995)).
264. Heinrich, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (citing White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp.
1380, 1383-84 (E.D. Wash. 1998)).
265. Id. at 320-21 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and citing Stadt v. Univ.
of Rochester, 921 F. Supp. 1023 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)).
266. WORLD MED. ORG., DECLARATION OF HELSINKI, 313 BRIT. MED. J.
1448-49 (1996), available at http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/helsinki (on
file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy); Annas, supra
note 259, at 24.
267. Annas, supra note 259, at 24-25 (citing WORLD MED. Ass'N, HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION, 2 WORLD MED.J. 14, 14-15 (1955)). The British drafter rea-
soned, "So long as the research worker is imbued with the Hippocratic ideal,
this and his conscience should be a sufficient guide." Id. at 25.
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(3) the research is not based on sufficient animal studies. 268 This
is also in accord with independent declarations of the General
Assembly and EC. 2 69 Research cloning violates each of these
principles.
The human clone also appears to lack a relationship with
any person qualified to subject it to experimentation. Parents
and legal guardians have a fiduciary-like responsibility to their
wards, rendering their proxy consent to experimentation on
progeny meaningful. 27 0 DNA and egg donors do not necessarily
have a similar responsibility to human clones. To the contrary, as
a condition of providing DNA or eggs, donors may disavow any
responsibility, financial or otherwise, for the human clone.
27 1
Regardless, fiduciaries may not expose their wards to more than
minimal risk.
The single American court to discuss intentionally exposing
a child to non-therapeutic experimentation (lead poisoning)
stated, "[I]n our view, parents whether improperly enticed by
trinkets, food stamps, money or other items, have no more right
to intentionally and unnecessarily place children in potentially
hazardous non-therapeutic research surroundings than do
researchers. In such cases, parental consent, no matter how
informed, is insufficient.
' 272
Proponents of HC object that human embryos are not juridi-
cal persons; therefore, the same rules of human experimentation
268. Initially, the Declaration of Helsinki expressly allowed proxy consent
"in accordance with national legislation" for therapeutic human experimenta-
tion, but not necessarily non-therapeutic experimentation. The Declaration
otherwise preserved the Code's emphasis on uncoerced, informed, and compe-
tent consent and, regardless of consent, left the responsibility for the human
subject on the researcher. The Declaration also firmly stated, "Concern for the
interests of the subject must always prevail over the interests of science and
society." The Declaration has been amended five times since, including as
recently as October 2000, so that now proxy consent for legally incompetent
persons is expressly prohibited unless "the research is necessary to promote the
health of the population represented and this research cannot instead be per-
formed on legally competent persons." The amended Declaration adds that
vulnerable research populations merit special protection and that human
experimentation should not proceed until there is ."adequate laboratory and,
where appropriate, animal experimentation." WORLD MED. ORG., supra note
268, at 1448-49.
269. U.N. ESCO, supra note 134, art. 5; Convention on Human Rights
and Biomedicine, supra note 134, arts. 5-6.
270. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 856-58 (Md. 2001).
271. Clones replicated from the DNA and eggs of those who would create
it are the closest to possessing a quasi-fiduciary relationship with the resulting
embryo, but these donors are still not exactly birth parents.
272. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 814.
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should not apply. Contrary to this view is a widely accepted defi-
nition of human subject experimentation: "any manipulation,
observation, or other study of a human being-or of anything related
to that human being that might subsequently result in manipula-
tion of that human being-done with the intent of developing
new knowledge and which differs in any form from customary
medical (or other professional) practice.
273
International human subject experimentation law exists in
general to vindicate the rights of vulnerable incompetent human
subjects.274 Its primary purpose is to preserve the autonomy, self-
determination, liberty, and equality of living human subjects,
275
and to compensate for the imbalance in power between the
researcher and subject and for their divergent interests nurtured
by the public-private cooperation undergirding biotechnology.
Accordingly, the burden of proof is upon those who would
entirely exempt living human embryos from this framework, not
upon those who would apply it.
b. U.S. Human Subjects Policy
The first systematic American effort to develop a policy to
protect the human subjects of experimentation incorporated the
Code. 276 However, the U.S. Human Subjects Policy was elabo-
rated through three waves of activism. In the 1960s, deformities
and other terrible side effects of the experimental drug
273. Robert LeVine, The Boundaries Between Biomedical or Behavioral
Research and the Accepted and Routine Practice of Medicine, in I NAT'L COMM'N FOR
THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS, THE BELMONT REPORT, app. (1979).
274. Note that HHS' Advisory Committee on Human Research Protec-
tions now advises on the responsible conduct of research involving human
embryos. See Rick Weiss, New Status for Embryos in Research, WASH. POST, Oct. 30,
2002, at A01 (referencing HHS Charter, Secretary's Advisory Committee on
Human Research Protections, which is available at http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.
gov/sachrp/charter.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2003) (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy)).
275. Morin, supra note 259, at 159 ("[T]he doctrine of informed consent
is rooted in some of the most fundamental values of Anglo-Saxon legal philoso-
phy-individuality, autonomy, and bodily integrity."); This is a reflection of the
common law that holds no right more sacred "than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of [the human being's] own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law." Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
276. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 821 (S.D. Ohio
1995) (citing Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Navy, Air Force
(Feb. 26, 1953)); Morin, supra note 259, at 169 ("[B]y 1952, the Armed Forces
Medical Policy Council adopted a resolution whereby principles found in the
Nuremberg Code were to become the guidelines of research related to atomic,
biologic, and chemical warfare.").
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Thalidomide became known (along with unrelated monopoly
and pricing concerns), leading Congress to hold its first hearing
to discuss the need for informed consent in human subject
experimentation trials.277 This led to amendments to the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, granting the FDA authority to screen
drugs for their efficacy and safety.
278
In 1966, continued reports of abuses of informed consent
even at America's finest hospitals 279 stimulated the Surgeon Gen-
eral and FDA to announce new policies governing the use of
experimental drugs, which adopted language from the Code and
Declaration (particularly their consent provisions).28° Compli-
ance with the FDA's policy became a condition of experimental
drug trials,281 whereas compliance with the Surgeon General's
277. Morin, supra note 259, at 170-71.
278. Id. at 171 (citing Drug Industry Act of 1962, 108 CONG. REC.
17395-99 (1962)). The Declaration was announced in 1964 on the eve of the
FDA's proposal to standardize research on experimental drugs. Annas, supra
note 259, at 25.
279. Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human
Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34
UCLA L. REv. 67, 71 n.12 (1986) (citing, inter alia, Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and
Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966)). Two experiments
attracted the most attention: one involving the experimental injection of cancer
cells into elderly patients who could not consent at a Jewish Chronic Disease
Hospital and the unsuccessful transplant of a chimpanzee's kidney into a
human being. Morin, supra note 259, at 173.
280. Concerning the FDA's Statement of Policy Concerning Consent for
Use of Investigational New Drugs on Humans, see Morin, supra note 259, at 171
(citing 31 Fed. Reg. 11,415 (1966)). Subsection (h) stated,
"Consent" or "informed consent" means that the person involved has
legal capacity to give consent, is so situated as to be able to exercise
free power of choice, and is provided with a fair explanation of all
material information concerning the administration of the investiga-
tional drug, or his possible use as a control, as to enable him to make
an understanding decision as to his willingness to receive said investi-
gational drug. This latter element requires that before the acceptance
of an affirmative decision by such person the investigator should make
known to him.., that the person may be used as a control; the exis-
tence of alternative forms of therapy, if any; and the effects upon his
health or person that may possibly come from the administration of
the investigational drug.
31 Fed. Reg. 11,415(h). For the Surgeon General's Policy Statement on
Clinical Investigations Using Human Subjects, see Morin, supra note 261, at
174; Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at 487-88 (citing Memorandum from
Surgeon General to Heads of Institution Conducting Research with Public
Health Service Grants (Feb. 8, 1966), quoted in W. CuRRAN & E. SHAPIRO, LAW,
MEDICINE, AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 898 (2d ed. 1970)).
281. See Morin, supra note 259, at 171-72.
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policy became a condition of extramural funding and, eventu-
ally, all DHEW grants and contracts.282
In 1974, the Willowbrook hepatitis study and Tuskegee tri-
als 28 3 catalyzed establishment of the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, IRBs, and adoption of the Federal Policy for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects (Human Subjects Policy).284 Under-
lying the Human Subjects Policy is an emphasis on promoting
individual autonomy, protecting the patient-subject's status as a
human being worthy of respect, minimizing fraud and duress,
and encouraging self-scrutiny by the physician-researcher.
285
Amended frequently since, the Human Subjects Policy today
applies to all "research" involving 1VF, 28 6 "human beings,' 287 and
"human subjects."2 8 8 Since 1981, it has also applied to some sam-
ples of blood and tissue.289 Except in certain circumstances, 29 °
the Policy requires: (1) legally effective informed consent of the
282. Morin, supra note 259, at 174; Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at
488. By the 1960s, the National Institutes of Health, which was established in
1953 as the Clinical Center of the National Institutes of Health, had become an
important funder of medical research. Morin, supra note 259, at 173-74.
283. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 730 (1973)
(researchers studying syphilis failed to inform African-Americans of the availa-
bility of penicillin).
284. 39 Fed. Reg. 18,914 (May 30, 1974); Morin, supra note 259, at 175;
Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at 488-89.
285. See generally R.R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT (1986); D.J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How
LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING (1991); Morin,
supra note 259, at 159; A.M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease
Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 341, 349 (1974).
286. Protection of Human Subjects, Additional Protections for Pregnant
Women, Human Fetuses and Neonates Involved in Research, 45 C.F.R.
§ 4 6 .203(g) (2001). IVF is defined as "any fertilization of human ova which
occurs outside the body of a female, either through admixture of donor human
sperm and ova or by any other means." Id.
287. Id. § 46.116. The Code does not define "human being."
288. Id. § 46.101 (a). "Human subjects" are defined as "living individu-
als." Id. § 46.102(f).
289. Id. § 46.102(f) (2) ("includes ...physical procedures by which data
are gathered (for example, venipuncture) ..... But see id. § 46.101(b) (5)
(exemptions).
290. The Human Subjects Policy exempts certain types of research
including educational research, research involving surveys and interviews,
research that consists of observing public behavior, and research that uses
existing records or data. Id. §§ 46.101(b) (1)-(6). Informed consent may also
be modified or waived when research concerns an evaluation of certain govern-
ment programs or presents only minimal risk to subjects and "could not practi-
cably be carried out without the waiver or alteration." Id. §§ 46.101(b) (6),
46.116(d) (1)-(3).
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subject or the subject's legally authorized representative;291 (2)
minimization of risks;292 (3) risks to subjects reasonable in rela-
tion to anticipated benefits;293 and (4) additional safeguards to
protect the rights and welfare of subjects when some or all of
them are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue
influence.
29 4
The Human Subjects Policy defines research as "a systematic
investigation, including research development, testing and evalu-
ation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowl-
edge. 29 5  Curiously, it does not define "informed consent,"
except by way of listing those items researchers must disclose to
human subjects.2 9 6 Plainly, the Human Subjects Policy also
acknowledges that some proxy consent to research is not legally
effective. The Policy clarifies that "minimal risk" exists when "the
probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in
the research are not greater in and of themselves than those
ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of
routine physical or psychological examinations or tests. "297
In general, the Human Subjects Policy anticipates that the
medical profession will police itself.298 It includes no remedy for
a violation beyond terminating a federal grant or not qualifying
for additional ones.299 Instead, the Policy requires principal
investigators of federally-funded studies and studies subject to
FDA regulation to certify compliance and answer to IRBs.
300
IRBs are supposed to be composed of a racially and culturally
diverse cross-section of the scientific and lay communities and
not to have competing interests that prevent unbiased perform-
ance of their duties.3 °' In practice, medical institutions retain
291. Id. § 46.116; Id. § 46.111(a) (4).
292. Id. §46.111(a)(1).
293. Id. § 46.111(a) (2).
294. Id. § 46.111(b).
295. Id. § 46.102(d).
296. Id. §§ 46.116(a)(1)-(8).
297. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102; see also id. §§ 46.401-09 (stating that children
may be subject only to a minor increase over minimal risk).
298. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.123; 48 C.F.R. § 309.4 (1985) (debarment
of federal contracts); Morin, supra note 259, at 498; Robertson on IRBs, supra
note 233, at 544.
299. Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at 498; Morin supra note 259, at
175 (NIH had "no enforcement authority beyond refusing to grant funds
300. 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a); see also Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at
499 ("To receive funds, a researcher must be affiliated with an institution that
has an approved general or special assurance on file."). Accordingly, the
Human Subjects Policy is also referred to as the General Assurance. Id.
301. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107(b), (e).
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"broad discretion" over IRB composition, policies, procedures,
and transparency. 30 2 DHEW review of IRB operations is negligi-
ble.30 3 Once more, until recently, IRBs and medical institutions
have been protected altogether from private litigation. 3°4 "Con-
sequently, institutions and the investigators who comprise the
IRBs, rather than the subjects whom IRBs ostensibly aim to pro-
tect, largely determine the extent of regulation. "305 Even the
researchers IRBs are supposed to control are independent of
them, because IRBs rarely interfere in experimentation after
approving it except on a perfunctory annual basis.
30 6
Many criticize this regulatory structure because of both "con-
flicts of interest" and "conflicts of value" that arise between sub-
jects and researchers.30 7 The former arise when the researcher
has a direct economic interest in the outcome of the research.30 8
The latter are always present because experimentation impacts a
researcher's professional prestige and career advancement. 30 9 As
a result, commentators say researchers treat the requirements of
302. Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at 493, 537-40.
303. Id. at 547-48 ("DHEW control of IRB operations, however, is actu-
ally quite limited. In extreme situations, DHEW may find IRB activities and
procedures inadequate and refuse to provide funds or demand stricter compli-
ance with its requirements and more closely monitor institutional performance.
Nevertheless . . .the IRB is legally subject to the policy choices of institutional
authorities, not the DHEW.").
304. See id. at 530-45 (discussing immunity provided to medical peer
review committee members that potentially include IRB members, and the
inapplicability of FOIA and potential inapplicability of state FOIA laws, privi-
leges, confidentiality of peer review committee records, and unregulated IRB
record retention policies); cf Morin, supra note 259, at 207-10 (indicating that
in recent cases involving human experimentation, "the role of hospitals and
IRBs has been scrutinized and liability ascribed to hospitals when affiliated
investigators have failed to secure informed consent") (citing Kus v. Sherman
Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Friter v. IOLAB Corp., 607 A.2d
1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
305. Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at 546. Moreover, the research
subjects who are supposed to be selected to prevent over-reliance on certain
groups are generally young, poor, and ill. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 46.107, with Del-
gado & Leskovac, supra note 279, at 101-02. See also Churchill et al., supra note
112, at 42.
306. Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at 547-48.
307. Churchill et al., supra note 112, at 38 (conflicts of interest); Jesse A.
Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the Regula-
tory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 63, 104
(1993); Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 279, at 91-92, 97-101 (conflicts of
value); Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at 548-49 (calling for structural
modifications to the IRB system to enhance subject protection without losing
the advantages of institutional control).
308. Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 279, at 91-92.
309. Id. at 97-101, 104.
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the Policy as empty formalities-Miranda Rights-and report a
paternalistic attitude on the part of researchers that they know
best what is good for subjects and society.31° Furthermore, they
note a "persistent failure to distinguish clearly between research
and therapy in medical science," particularly when research sub-
jects are also patients or when research takes place within the
clinical environment.
3 1'
These problems are exacerbated in biotechnological
research. The reasons are three-fold: (1) inflammatory rhetoric
about the near-miraculous therapeutic potential of biotechnol-
ogy; (2) the regulatory structure; and (3) the close relationship
between the scientific and industrial community. Heightened
expectations for biotechnological research exist, because it has
the potential not merely to manage disease, but cure it. 1 2 No
other therapeutic modality except vaccines holds this poten-
tial.3 13 However, proponents of biotechnology fail to distinguish
this potential from its present state-of-the-art by, among other
things, misappropriating terms like "therapy" (e.g., "gene ther-
apy" and "therapeutic cloning")."14 Frequently, proponents also
engage in a form of genetic determinism, understating the envi-
ronmental, behavioral, and social causes of disease.31 5
According to the Belmont Report, the practice of accepted
therapy denotes "interventions that are designed solely to
enhance the well-being of an individual patient.., and that have
a reasonable expectation of success." '16 In contrast, research is
"an activity designed to test a hypothesis . . . and contribute to
generalizable knowledge." 317 Under this definition, cloning and
GE constitute research, not therapy. So-called therapeutic clon-
ing is precisely the opposite, because it kills the human subject.
310. Id. at 84; see also Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807,
839 (Md. 2001) ("Researchers, under competitive pressure and also financial
pressure from corporate backers, operate under a paternalistic approach to
research subjects, asserting professional expertise and arguing experimental
necessity while minimizing the right to self-determination-a key aspect of the
exercise of autonomy-of their subjects.").
311. Churchill et al., supra note 112, at 38.
312. Id. at 43.
313. Id.
314. Id. (concerning gene "therapy").
315. Id.
316. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE
PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMED. & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT
REPORT, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (Apr. 18, 1979), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/
mpa/belmont.php3 (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics & Pub-
lic Policy) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT].
317. Id.
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Even so-called gene therapy has failed to demonstrate a single
unambiguous instance of therapy. 18
Notwithstanding the death ofJesse Gelsinger, the idea that it
is discriminatory to exclude individuals from participating in bio-
technological trials has great currency. The public appears not
to understand that, for the most part, it is pure experimentation
unlikely to lead to any direct benefit to the subject, as opposed to
some possible attenuated benefit for future generations. 319 The
long-standing Western tradition of permitting desperately ill
patients to participate in therapeutic trials is miles from this sce-
nario, where the subject stands to gain nothing and lose every-
thing. Yet the regulatory structure for gene therapy is still
modeled primarily upon a therapeutic alliance between physi-
cian and patient.320 With the possible exception of the FDA, all
of the institutions responsible to regulate the research have a
vested interest in promoting it.
3 2 1
The "science push," instead of "market pull" of biotechnol-
ogy, nurtures close relationships between biotechnological firms
and universities, which spills over into public regulation when
elites in both sectors cross over to the NIH and FDA. It further
influences basic research and scientists' objectivity.3 22 Corporate
funding and stock valuation hinge upon invention and diffusion,
reducing the incentive for basic research and creating pressure
to exaggerate success. 23 Scientists performing research cloning
have substantial interests generally in promoting biotechnology
and specifically in patenting inventions.3 24 Research institutions
"usually will share the goals and interests of researchers; research
318. See supra Part I(B) (3) (a).
319. See Churchill et al., supra note 112, at 40.
320. See Rainsbury, supra note 52, at 595-600; Churchill et al., supra note
112, at 40 (focusing on FDA and NIH "emergency" gene research and drug
protocols).
321. The RAC still has minimal authority to monitor clinical trials and
industry has reason to avoid disclosing adverse reactions due to proprietary con-
cerns. See Rainsbury, supra note 52, at 598-600.
322. See MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX (1986); ALAN T. BULL ET AL., BIOTECHNOLOGYr INTERNATIONAL TRENDS
AND PERSPECTIES (OECD ed., 1982); REPORT ON RESEARCH ON GENE THERAPY,
supra note 100; Fransman, supra note 43, at 77, 92 (scientists have invested their
capital in biotechnology leading to the risk of "hi-tech hype").
323. Churchill et al., supra note 112, at 42. As an example, consider
ACT's claim to have cloned the first human being, which was later disputed by
most in the field and deemed merely a ploy to raise funds. See Kolata & Pollack,
supra note 258.
324. Kaji & Leiden, supra note 100, at 549 (concerning investigators'
financial interests in companies with which they conduct clinical trials); Churc-
hill et al., supra note 112, at 43.
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productivity may be as important to the institution as to the well-
being of individual researchers.
32
1
The cluster of scientific, economic, and cultural hopes
swirling around our genes seems to intensify and sustain
the future promise of gene therapy at the same time that it
frames this revolutionary concept in traditional garb-as
merely the next wave of therapeutic options. The failure
to discuss these factors candidly leads regulators, profes-
sionals, and the public to perpetuate confusion, misrepre-
sentation, and disappointment in the sometimes




This section explores the patentability under international
and U.S. patent law of processes to clone human life and chi-
mera and the clones themselves. The purpose of a patent is to
reward an inventor for creative effort by granting an exclusive
right to make, use, or sell an invention or assign it for a limited
duration. Patents stimulate investment and reward publication
of knowledge, thereby precluding duplication of research and
permitting successors to build on prior art. We explore below
whether applying this regime to all that biotechnology propo-
nents would prefer is appropriate.
a. International Patent Law
The 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPs) provides that members of the
World Trade Organization may exclude from patentability
"inventions, the prevention within their territory of... which is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious
prejudice to the environment."327 The TRIPs agreement adds
that members may exclude from patentability, "diagnostic, thera-
peutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or ani-
mals" and "plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and
essential biological processes for the production of plants or ani-
325. Robertson on IRBs, supra note 233, at 547.
326. Churchill et al., supra note 112, at 43-44.
327. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex IC, §5, art. 27(2), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/
legal_e/final_e.htm (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics & Pub-
lic Policy).
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mals other than non-biological and microbiological
processes.
3 28
This exception in TRIPs reflects the content of patent stat-
ues in most of the industrialized world except the United States,
precluding the patenting of inventions "contrary to ordre public or
morality.31 29 Regional integration efforts have also adopted the
ordre public exception, most importantly the European Union
(EU).33° Even America's common law originally embraced the
idea.331
From the early-nineteenth century until midway through
this one, U.S. courts withheld patents on inventions falling
chiefly within two classes: (1) inventions used to defraud buyers,
particularly medicinal products, and (2) machines used for gam-
bling. 32 Although never overruled, this so-called beneficial util-
ity theory fell out of favor in the 1970s and has since been
discussed only in dicta.13 The United States opposed incorpora-
328. Id. art. 27(3).
329. See PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (Alan J. Jacobs ed., 4th ed.
1996).
330. See European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 53, available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar53.html (on file with
the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy) ("European patents
shall not be granted in respect of: (a) inventions the publication of which
would be contrary to 'ordre public' or morality, provided that the exploitation
shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or
regulation in some or all of the contracting States .... "); Council Directive 98/
44, art. 6(1) 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 18 [hereinafter Directive] ("Inventions shall
be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be con-
trary to ordre public or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to
be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation."); Japanese
Patent Law, Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 32 ("The inventions liable to contravene
public order, morality or public health shall not be patented .... "), available at
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shoukaie/patent.htm (last accessed Feb. 9, 2003) (on file
with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
331. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F.Cas. 1018 (C.C. Mass. 1817) (Story, J.). "The
principle derives from an early British patent statute, which excluded otherwise
patentable inventions that were "contrary to the law .... mischievous to the
State, by raising prices of commodities at home .... or generally inconvenient."
M. Bruce Harper, TRIPs Article 27.2: An Argument for Caution, 21 WM. & MARY
ENVrL. L. & POL'v REv. 381, 413 (1997) (quoting 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS § 4 (1979)) (ellipses in original).
332. Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent
System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REv. 1051, 1062-65 (1988).
333. ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LipscoMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS 538-41
(1984) (citing ExParte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801 (Bd. App. 1977); Application
of Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1969)). But see Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma
Prod.-und Mktg. Gesellschaft M.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (dis-
cussing Lowell in dicta).
CREATING CLONES, KIDS & CHIMERA
tion of the ordre public or morality exception in TRIPs, but it
nonetheless survived.33 4
Under the European Patent Convention (EPC), ordre public
grants Europeans standing to challenge individual patents and
thereby shape biotechnology policy.33 5 The Technical Board of
the European Patent Organization (EPO) has held that the doc-
trine requires "a careful weighing up of the suffering of animals
and possible risks to the environment on one hand, and the
invention's usefulness to mankind on the other. ' 33 6 In contrast,
we shall see that the American public has no general right to
intervene in the prosecution of patent applications to prevent
their issuance.33 7
Some patent statutes and international treaties specifically
enumerate types of biotechnology contrary to ordre public. For
example, Australia has outlawed patenting human beings.33 8
Likewise, the European Parliament's Directive on the Legal Pro-
tection of Biotechnological Inventions (Directive) lists as con-
trary to ordre public- (a) processes for cloning human beings; (b)
processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human
beings; and (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commer-
cial purposes. 9
334. Harper, supra note 331, at 415.
335. Scalise & Nugent, supra note 64, at 1014. The EPC provides uniform
procedures and standards for examining a European patent application, but
reserves to members of the European Union the task of interpreting and
enforcing a patent thus granted. See Robin Beck Skarstad, Comment, The Euro-
pean Union's Self-Defeating Policy: Patent Harmonization and the Ban on Human Clon-
ing, 20 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 353, 363 (1999) (citing Scalise & Nugent, supra
note 64, at 1013). In contrast, the European Parliament's Directive on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (Directive) was adopted to
facilitate harmonization of these policies in pursuit of a European competitive
advantage. See Chambers, supra note 63 (citing Skarstad, supra, at 367-68).
On October 20, 1988, the European Commissioners proposed the
Directive on the Legal Protections of Biotechnological Inventions to
supersede the EPC and harmonize European patent law to protect the
biotechnology industry .... The Directive became effective with its
publication on July 30, 1998, and it ordered Member States to comply
with its mandate by July 30, 2000.
Skarstad, supra, at 367-68.
336. Decision T 19/90-3.3.2, 1990 O.J. Eur. Pat. Off. 476, 477.
337. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
338. Section 18(2) of the Australian 1990 Act provides that "[h]uman
beings and the biological processes for their generation[ ] are not patentable
inventions." MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL, PATENT LAW 174 (1998).
339. Directive, supra note 330, art. 6. The earliest draft of this provision
would have rendered unpatentable "the human body or parts of the human
body per se... processes for modifying the genetic identity of the human body
20031
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Although not an exhaustive list, the Directive states that
these processes "offend against human dignity," as would
processes to produce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells
of humans and animals."34 Accordingly, these "are obviously
also excluded from patentability,"' as is the human body "at the
various stages of its formation and development" and its gene
sequence, except for an element isolated from the human body
including a gene. 42 The EPC adds that "methods for treatment
of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnos-
tic methods practiced on the human or animal body" '343 are not
patentable. The EPO has interpreted this to prevent patents on
gene research.344
Developing countries generally altogether resist patenting
plants and animals and resent what they term "biopiracy" or
"bioprospecting" of their genetic patrimony.345 They are also
generally opposed to intellectual property rights, which leaders
believe impede development and are too expensive to
enforce.346  Article 27 was a condition of their support for
TRIPs;347 however, the Convention on Biological Diversity, which
for a non-therapeutic purpose which is contrary to the dignity of man." Scalise &
Nugent, supra note 64, at 1026-27 (emphasis added). This reveals a connection
between human subject experimentation law and patent law.
340. Directive, supra note 330, at Preamble 38. Industrialized countries
also generally limit the enforceability of a patent against the progeny of com-
mercial transgendered animals. For example, the Directive states that farmers
who purchased patented livestock may make them available for agricultural
activity, but not for commercial reproduction. Id. art. 11(2). Likewise, the
propagation of transgendered animals necessarily resulting from the applica-
tion for which they were marketed is allowed. Id. art. 10 (under the EPC, a
conflict of authority exists over whether the progeny of transgendered animals
and plants are protected).
341. Id.
342. Id. art. 5.
343. European Patent Convention, supra note 330, art. 52(4).
344. BRUKER/Non-Invasive Measurements T 385/8, 6 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep.
357, 359 (1988).
345. See Skarstad, supra note 335, at 374; Emily Marden, The Neem Tree
Patent: International Conflict over the Commodification of Life, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 279, 279-80, 290-94 (1999) (developing countries view bioprospecting
as an "insidious new form of colonialism" and generally reject the patentability
of life due to religious convictions); Cheryl D. Hardy, Comment, Patent Protec-
tion and Raw Materials: The Convention on Biological Diversity and Its Implications for
U.S. Policy on the Development and Commercialization of Biotechnology, 15 U. PA. J.
INT'L Bus. L. 299 (1994).
346. Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPs
Agreement: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries Toward the Patenta-
bility of Biotechnology, 6J. INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 54-55 (1998).
347. Id. at 44-45.
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calls for, among other things, transfers of patented technology,
best reflects their views.
348
b. U.S. Patent Law
The U.S. Constitution provides that "Congress shall have
power... to promote the progress of science and useful arts by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries." '349 The Patent
Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson (himself an accom-
plished architect and inventor), defined patentable subject mat-
ter as "any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement
[thereof]. '"5' This language remains part of the U.S. Code,
apart from the substitution of the word "process" for "art."
351
Under the Patent Act, "[d]espite the anomalous patent,
such as that issued to Louis Pasteur in 1873 for his purified cul-
ture of yeast, the courts invariably rejected patents that involved
living subject matter. '3 52 The primary reason was the "products
of nature" doctrine, which stands for the proposition that some-
thing cannot be "new" if it already exists in nature.353 One of the
348. Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 8(j), 15-16 (1992), available
at http://www.biodiv.org/convention (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy). On reconciling this with TRIPs, see Valentina
Tejera, Note, Tripping Over Property Rights: Is It Possible to Reconcile the Convention
on Biological Diversity with Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement?, 33 NEw ENG. L. REv.
967, 981 (1999).
349. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
350. Patent Act of 1793, 1 Stat. 319 § 1 (1793).
351. This substitution was made in 1952, when Congress re-codified the
patent laws. Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 797 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 101). The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted "manufacture" to mean "the
production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these
materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-
labor or by machinery." Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1908)
(citing Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931)). "Composi-
tion of matter" includes "all compositions of two or more substances and.., all
composite articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of
mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powers or solids." Id. (cit-
ing Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F.Supp. 279, 280 (D.C. 1957)).
352. Scalise & Nugent, supra note 64, at 1003; see also KRIMsKV, supra note
65, at 46-47 (after Louis Pasteur received the first patent on a living microorga-
nism in 1873 (e.g., purified yeast), nine additional patents issued on single-cel-
led organisms from 1908 to 1925 (e.g., ground vegetable or animal matter
inoculated with bacteria, bacteria mixed with cocoa, food product containing
lactic acid bacilli, and microorganisms in vegetable oil)); Ryan M.T. Iwasaka,
Note, Chakrabarty to Chimeras: The Growing Need for Evolutionary Biology in Patent
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1505, 1511 (2000).
353. Scalise & Nugent, supra note 64, at 999.
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earliest decisions articulating this doctrine found the fiber within
pine needles unpatentable:
Even if... this were the first time that men had discovered
that a fiber existed in the leaves and needles of the trees
which could be... made useful for mankind, it is doubtful
whether the invention would consist of anything more
than the process by which the fiber could be taken from
the natural leaf.... Otherwise it would be possible for an
element or a principle to be secured by patent, and the
patentee would obtain the right, to the exclusion of all
other men, of securing . . . the fiber which nature has
produced. 54
Although the product of nature doctrine is simple, judicato-
ries have struggled to apply it consistently to distinguish products
of nature from patentable processes using these products.355
Until 1930, the PTO understood the doctrine to preclude the
patenting not merely of animals, but also plants.356 Congress
addressed this concern and the inability of inventors to provide
an adequate "written description" of plants in 1930 by passing
the Plant Patent Act, which expanded patentable matter to cer-
tain varieties of asexually reproduced plants (i.e., plants propa-
gated by cuttings, grafting, and budding, but not seeds).357
An explosion in plant breeding followed, which, together
with the rise of pesticide and herbicide use, led to the Green
Revolution. Sexually reproduced plants were not included in the
Plant Patent Act of 1930, because, according to the U.S. Supreme
Court, "new varieties could not be reproduced true-to-type
through seedlings. '3 58 By 1970, this problem had been resolved;
therefore, Congress also extended plant variety protection to
novel strains of sexually-reproduced plants (except fungi, bacte-
354. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTs § 1.02[7] [a], 1-30 to 1-34
(citing Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Comm'n Dec. 13, 125-27 (1889)) (ellipses in
CHISUM, supra).
355. Scalise & Nugent, supra note 64, at 999-1001; see, e.g., Dennis v.
Pitner, 106 F.2d 142, 143 (7th Cir. 1939) ("A discovery in the field of science of
a new quality of phenomenon of an old product may be... the proper subject
of a patent.").
356. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 311-12 (PTO granted two patents stating
claims for living microorganisms in 1967 and 1968).
357. Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. § 161 ("Whoever invents or dis-
covers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including
cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a
tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a
patent therefore ....").
358. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
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ria, or first-generation hybrids), rendering patentable major food
crops developed through classical hybridization techniques.359
This legislation, together with the Patent Act, provided the
backdrop for the U.S. Supreme Court's pathbreaking Char-
krabarty decision in 1980, holding oil-digesting bacterium patent-
able.36" Arguing for the opposite result, the government
contended (1) bacteria were excluded from the Plant Patent Act
of 1930; (2) the Patent Act did not apply to living things (as evi-
denced by the Plant Patent Acts of 1930 and 1970); and (3)
genetic engineering technology was unforeseen when Congress
enacted the Patent Act. 361' Four Justices agreed, insisting that at
least since 1930, Congress must have intended the PTO not to
patent living organisms under the Patent Act; otherwise, plants
could have been patented without the Plant Patent Act of 1930
and 1970.362 They argued that Congress expressly excluded bac-
teria from protection under the Plant Patent Act of 1970, indicat-
ing its affirmative intent not to patent bacteria.
63
The Charkrabarty majority disagreed, arguing that the rele-
vant distinction Congress meant to draw under the Patent Act
was not between living and inanimate things, but between prod-
ucts of nature (whether or not living) and human-made inven-
tions.364 The majority added that patent law inevitably addresses
unforeseen technologies, discounting the minority's argument
that Congress presumed the product of nature doctrine ren-
dered this type of invention unpatentable.365
The PTO and its judicatories took the next steps toward pat-
enting plants and animals. The Board of Patent Appeals and
359. Plant Variety Protection Action of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat.
1547 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)) ("The breeder of any novel variety of
sexually reproduced plant (other than fungi, bacteria, or first generation
hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety.., shall be entitled to plant variety
protection therefore ....").
360. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (1952). Chakrabarty, who worked for
General Electric Company, applied for a patent with three claims: the process
of making the microbe, a method of dispersal, and the organism itself. The
PTO granted all but the last one. PTO's denial was on the grounds that micro-
organisms are products of nature and living things are not patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 305-06.
361. Id. at 310-11, 313-15.
362. Id. at 319-20 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Powell,JJ., dissenting).
363. Id. at 321 n.3.
364. Id. at 313. The Court distinguished Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant,
333 U.S. 127 (1948), where the inventor produced no new bacteria, but merely
combined existing species of root-nodule bacteria to inoculate seeds. "Here, by
contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature . . . ." Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
365. Compare id. at 316, with id. at 305 n.2.
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Interferences was the first to extend Charkrabarty by holding that
non-naturally occurring, multi-celled plants are patentable under
the Patent Act.366 Then, the same body held patentable multi-
cellular organisms known as polyploid oysters (non-naturally
occurring oysters produced by making multiple copies of genes
through hydrostatic pressure, not biotechnology).367 Within
days, the PTO announced that it would begin treating all non-
naturally occurring, multi-celled organisms (animals) as patenta-
ble, except humans.368 The PTO grounded the exception for
humans on an unspecified constitutional objection widely
assumed to be the Thirteenth Amendment.
369
A year after the PTO's policy announcement, animal rights
organizations, farmers, and others brought suit challenging it as
an improper exercise of agency discretion in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).37° They lost on multiple
grounds, including that the plaintiffs lacked standing, because
the patent statute did not grant members of the public the right
to intervene in the prosecution of patent applications and they
could not demonstrate injury proximately caused by the mere
issuance (as opposed to use) of a patent.3 7l The Court reserved
the question whether the PTO's exclusion of humans from pat-
entability was substantive. 72
The PTO issued the first patent on a multi-celled animal on
April 12, 1988, the Harvard Onco-mouse. 373 The PTO now regu-
larly grants patents on a barnyard of transgenic animals, includ-
ing some with spliced human DNA expressing human hormones
366. Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 447 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf.
1985).
367. Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1987),
affd, 846 F.2d 77 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding multicellular animals patentable but
rejecting the particular application made in this case for unrelated reasons).
368. See Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks, Policy Statement on Patentabil-
ity of Animals, 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFcE 24 (Apr. 7, 1987), reprinted in DONALD
S. CHISUM, CHlSUM ON PATENTS app. 24-2 to 24-3 (1998). Critics of the expan-
sion of Chakrabarty to this extent note the progressively narrower forums in
which decisions about patentability have been made from the legislature to the
courts to the executive branch. See, e.g., KR1MSKv, supra note 65, at 48.
369. Id.; see also Magnani, supra note 3, at 448.
370. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
371. Id. at 929-30. On standing, the Court noted that third parties have
no right to intervene in the prosecution of patent applications to prevent their
issuance. Id. at n.9. And the Court rejected appellants' claims to have suffered
injuries traced to the challenged action that could be redressed by a favorable
decision. Id. at 930.
372. Id. at n.9.
373. Magnani, supra note 3, at 448.
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or other chemicals that animals do not produce in nature. 74
The PTO also regularly allows patents on human cell lines and
methods of deriving them, including, as of 2001, 1,000 patents
covering gene research, some of which would yield transgenic
humans.1 5 The PTO has even issued a patent covering the prod-
uct and a procedure to clone humans through at least
parthenogenesis.
3 76
Nonetheless, the stated position of the PTO continues to be
that it will not grant patents on human life nor even a process to
create human life, albeit the agency has publicly abandoned the
Thirteenth Amendment as the reason.377 Instead, in April 1998,
the PTO resurrected justice Story's beneficial utility theory as the
rationale why humans and chimera are not patentable:
374. Iwasaka, supra note 352, at 1532. By 1999, the PTO had received
over 1,900 patent applications for genetically altered animals. Id.
375. Warren D. Woessner, The Evolution of Patents on Life-Transgenic Ani-
mals, Clones, and Stem Cells, 83J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 830, 844 (2001);
Magnani, supra note 3, at 448; Munro, supra note 66.
376. Andrew Pollack, Debate on Human Cloning Turns to Patents, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 2002, at A14; Antonio Regalado, Patent on Human-Cloning Method
is Granted, Despite Current Policy, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2002, at D3 [hereinafter
Regalado I]; see also Press Release, Patent Watch, The U.S. Patent Office (PTO)
Has Granted a Patent on Human Reproductive Cloning and the Embryos,
Fetuses and Children that Would Be Created Through that Process (May 16,
2002), available at http://www.patentwatchproject.org (on file with the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy). At least three additional pend-
ing patent applications cover cloned human embryos and fetuses and an addi-
tional application would patent a human-mouse chimera, dubbed the
humouse, and fuse human cells with those of a monkey, ape, or other animal.
Id. (applications from Geron Corp., the University of Connecticut, and Univer-
sity of Massachusetts cover cloned human embryos); Aaron Zitner, Patently Pro-
voking a Debate, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2002; Rick Weiss, Ri/kin Files Human-Chimp
Chimera Patent, WASH. PosT, Apr. 2, 1998, at A12. The humouse application
submitted in 1997 was initially rejected in 1999, because it embraced a human
being.
377. Pollack, supra note 376. ("Brigid Quinn, a spokeswoman for the pat-
ent office, said the agency was not using the 13th Amendment argument any-
more but was not granting patents on humans because it had not received any
guidance from Congress or the courts saying it should do so."); Regalado I,
supra note 376 ("Our policy is that we do not issue patents to claims drawn to
humans. Our policy has not changed."); Munro, supra note 66 ("The U.S. Pat-
ent and Trademark Office does not issue patents drawn to human beings.");
Antonio Regalado, Ethical Concerns Block Widespread Patenting of Embryonic
Advances, WALL ST.J., Aug. 20, 2001, at Bi [hereinafter Regalado II] ("A spokes-
man for the Patent Office says the agency not only forbids patents on human
beings but also on any method for making them. The reason is that the owner
of a patented "process" can prevent anyone else from importing products made
using the technique. With cloning, that could lead to human clones born over-
seas being legally denied entry into the U.S.").
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The PTO will not . . . issue a patent for an invention of
incredible or specious utility or for inventions whose utili-
zation is not adequately disclosed in the application. Addi-
tionally, the courts have interpreted the utility requirement
to exclude inventions deemed to be "injurious to the well
being, good policy, or good morals of society." . . . [T]he
existence of a patent application directed to human/non-
human chimera has recently been discussed in the news
media. It is the position of the PTO that inventions
directed to human/non-human chimera could, under cer-
tain circumstances, not be patentable because, among
other things, they would fail to meet the public policy and
morality aspects of the utility requirement.
3 78
Although the beneficial utility doctrine remains valid with a
history of applicability to medical inventions, skeptics contend
the PTO is poorly suited to make normative judgments about
biotechnology.37 9 Some would avoid this by statutorily banning
the issuance of patents on human life and chimera.3 80 Precedent
for this exists in the U.S. Code regulating another dangerous
technology: atomic energy.
The Department of Defense (DOD) reviews patent applica-
tions pertaining to atomic energy to decide whether an invention
has weapons-related uses. 8 1 If the invention has only defense
applications, DOD is entitled to all the rights of the invention in
exchange for just compensation.3 8 2 Patents may not be issued at
all to private parties on inventions useful solely for atomic
weapons.
3 8 3
With respect specifically to medicine, U.S. patents are unen-
forceable in relation to "medical activity" defined as "a medical
or surgical procedure on a body. 3 8s4 The statute defines "body"
(rather unhelpfully) as a "human body, organ or cadaver, or a
nonhuman animal used in medical research or instruction
378. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MEDIA ADVISORY- FACTS ON PATENTING
LIFE FORMS HAVING A RELATIONSHIP To HUMANS (1998) (citations omitted),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm (Apr.
1, 1998) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
379. See, e.g., Nash, supra note 86, at 297-98 (citing Robert P. Merges,
Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and Controversial Technol-
ogies, 47 MD. L. REv. 1051, 1062 (1988)).
380. Amendment to Prohibit Patentability of Human Life Forms, 107th
Cong., 2d Sess. (May 2002).
381. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1982). Under this provision, the PTO must
review all patent applications for military application. Id. § 181.
382. 42 U.S.C. § 2187 (2000).
383. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2181(a) (1994).
384. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A) (2000).
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directly relating to the treatment of humans. ' 38 5 One commen-
tator argues a "human body" should not mean a living human
embryo and that HC should not be subject to the statute.386
c. Legal Regimes GE Implicates
Non-inheritable and inheritable GE remains purely an
invention with gene transfer research the more advanced of the
two. Both have hardly begun the trip along the S-curve, provid-
ing us with a unique opportunity to regulate GE in anticipation
of the legal questions it will inspire. Many are similar to HC,
because GE also bears upon reproductive rights, the First
Amendment, human subject experimentation law, and patent
law. Others raise troubling new questions about the limits of
parental authority to modify their progeny and equal protection.
d. Parental Rights
Procreative liberty and parental rights or the doctrine of
"family autonomy," are sometimes merged;.8 . however, they may
be understood as independent rights. Those preferring to treat
them as unified focus on dicta uniting the right to conceive and
the right to raise children.388 On the other hand, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized parents' rights construed as the right
to the care, custody, education, management, and control of
children long before it acknowledged procreative liberty.38 9
Most famously, the Court remarked, "The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations."
390
385. Id. § 287(c)(2)(E).
386. Nash, supra note 86, at 302.
387. Wu, supra note 90, at 1481-85; Coleman, supra note 33, at 157.
388. Wu notes that, otherwise, we are forced to find islands of protection
for procreative capacity, conception, gestation, childbirth, and child rearing.
Wu, supra note 90, at 1482-83 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972)).
389. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (invalidating a state
law prohibiting the teaching of any modern language other than English in
public school; explaining that the liberty guaranteed by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment "denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to [engage in the pursuit of happi-
ness]"); see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253-54 (1988) (stating in the
context of a custody battle that parenting rights are not part of procreation
rights).
390. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). As recently as
2000, the Court reaffirmed this precedent, emphasizing the primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66
(2000) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); see also Washington v.
2003]
134 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
Some would find in reproductive liberty"' l and others in
parental rights, 392 the right to clone or genetically modify chil-
dren. In this respect, one commentator argues Aldous Huxley
missed the most pressing ethical and legal question posed by GE
and cloning: it is not "How do we protect human reproduction
against government control?" but "Are there any limits to what
individuals or couples may do in their quest for happy, successful
offspring, for offspring in their own image and likeness?"
393
The predominant international response has been affirma-
tive. For example, the Council of Europe permits GE only for
preventive, diagnostic, or therapeutic reasons and only where it
does not aim to change the genetic make-up of a person's
descendants. 94 A U.S. Senate bill would also have outlawed
germline manipulation. 95 Professor Robertson has argued that
any such regulation would violate reproductive rights, except to
the extent it merely prevented parents from creating "offspring
who have fewer capacities than they could otherwise have
had.
39 6
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("In a long line of cases, we have held
that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the righ[t] ...
to direct the education and upbringing of one's children."); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing the "fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child");
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has
reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad paren-
tal authority over minor children."); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 ("It is plain that the
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his or her children 'come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking
when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic
arrangements.'"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is car-
dinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder.").
391. Robertson on Genetic Selection, supra note 142, at 465 (GE is a
reproductive right, but not necessarily cloning).
392. Coleman, supra note 33, at 159 ("[I]f science can give parents the
ability to mold their child into a specific makeup or disposition, even before
birth, then this ability certainly falls within the realm of the parental right to
direct or control the destiny of their child and 'prepare him for additional
obligations.'").
393. Maura A. Ryan, Cloning, Genetic Engineering, and the Limits of Procrea-
tive Liberty, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 753, 753 (1998).
394. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 134, art.
13.
395. See Human Germline Gene Modification Prohibition Act of 2001, S.
7123, 107th Cong. (2001).
396. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 170 (1994).
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Whereas some commentators worry that the state will restrict
GE, others are concerned that the state will permit or mandate it.
These scholars argue parents have a fundamental right to refuse
GS and GE.397 The Supreme Court has specifically upheld the
right of parents to forego treatment that might have prolonged
an infant's life, but without improving the infant's overall impair-
ment.39' GE will lead to much harder test cases when, for exam-
ple, parents decide against therapy in favor of bearing children
subject to inheritable disease or seek to invent new characteris-
tics for their progeny.
Parental rights are obviously not absolute. According to pre-
cedent involving adoption and visitation disputes, they may not
spring at all or not full-blown until conception.399 Certainly, the
Supreme Court has never held that parental rights (as distin-
guished from reproductive rights) vest prior to birth. Were strict
scrutiny to apply to the medical decisions of parents for their
children, the state could regulate them if it had a compelling
interest pursued in the least restrictive fashion. Two potential
compelling interests the Supreme Court has stated may legiti-
mate restricting parental rights include the health or safety of
children and, more controversially, parental decisions imposing
substantial social burdens.
400
397. See, e.g., Pelias & Blanton, supra note 167, at 531-32; Shepherd, supra
note 132, at 767.
398. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986) (reversing the
Department of Health and Human Services' attempt to discontinue federal
funding of a hospital that deprived an infant of treatment on the basis of her
handicap because the parents would not consent to the treatment).
399. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that
father's due process liberty interest in maintaining some connection with his
child was not sufficiently powerful to overcome a state.statutory presumption
that the husband of the child's mother was the child's parent; therefore, the
biological father could be denied visitation rights); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 260 (1983) (holding that putative biological father who had never estab-
lished an actual relationship with his child did not have a constitutional right to
notice of his child's adoption by the man who had married the child's mother;
a parent's liberty interest "'do[es] not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships more endur-
ing.'") (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)).
400. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) (finding that
parents' rights may be subject to limitation if it appears that parental decisions
will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for signifi-
cant social burdens); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-68 (2000).
So long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit),
there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that par-
ent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's
children.
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In keeping with this dictum, three primary legal regimes
already limit parental rights: child abuse laws, the best interest of
the child test, and wrongful life liability. 4°' Least controversially,
children's rights prevail over parental rights, in the event of child
labor, child abuse, and child neglect. Definitions of child abuse
and neglect vary among the states, but it is not uncommon for
them to cover neglecting or refusing to provide care necessary
for a child's health and creating a substantial risk of death, disfig-
urement, or impairment of bodily or mental functions.4 "2 Lim-
ited immunity exists in some states against child abuse and
neglect for parents who insist upon faith healing,4 "3 but a move-
ment has begun to abandon or interpret this exception
narrowly.
40 4
Some scholars contend the prevention of genetic disease is
so important that parents who decide to give birth to a child with
an inheritable disease should be criminally liable for child
abuse.4 °5 Child abuse statutes normally do not protect the
unborn, but there are exceptions.40 6 Courts have been hesitant
to characterize as child abuse or negligence parents' reasonable
Id. at 67-68.
401. See generally Shepherd, supra note 132.
402. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.04(1) (West 1987).
Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or
allows a child to be deprived of ... medical treatment, or who, know-
ingly or by culpable negligence, permits physical or mental injury to
the child, and in so doing causes great bodily harm, permanent disa-
bility, or permanent disfigurement to such child, shall be guilty of a
felony of the third degree.
Id.
403. See, e.g., CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 18950.5 (West 1998) ("For the
purposes of this chapter, a child receiving treatment by spiritual means... shall
not for that reason alone be considered an abused or neglected child.").
404. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1989) (en
banc) (holding that exemption to misdemeanor child neglect statute for par-
ents who utilized prayer treatment in lieu of medical care did not provide
defense to prosecution for involuntary manslaughter and felony child endan-
germent); Commonwealth v. Foster, 764 A.2d 1076, 1081 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)
(holding that parents were guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when
their religiously-grounded decision not to provide medical care to their son led
to his near death from a liver tumor even though they were exempt from prose-
cution for child abuse), appeal denied, 782 A.2d 542 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth
v. Nixon, 718 A.2d 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that although parents
whose religious beliefs led them to eschew medical treatment for their sick
child were exempt from child abuse, their due process rights to notice were not
violated when they were prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter), affd, 761
A.2d 1151 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1008 (2001).
405. Margery W. Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL
MED. 63, 98-104 (1984).
406. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 48.981(1)(h) (2001).
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medical judgment about what is best for their children, but have
indicated that the graver the risks to children, the more likely the
judgment of medical professionals about the children's best
interests will prevail.4" 7 This model of "reviewable parental dis-
cretion" appeals to many geneticists who would at least limit the
ability of parents to refuse potential genetic therapies.40 '
Another model vindicating the interests of children over
parents some would adapt from the child custody context is the
"best interests of the child" test.40 9 The drawback of this test is
that it is not always obvious what is in the best interests of the
child or, more particularly, that judges are better equipped to
make this evaluation than parents. Critics argue that the best
"Subject" means a person or unborn child named in a report or
record as any of the following:
1. A child who is the victim or alleged victim of abuse or neg-
lect or who is threatened with abuse or neglect.
Im. An unborn child who is the victim or alleged victim of abuse
or who is at substantial risk of abuse.
Id.
407. See Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 757 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 820 (2001) (refusing to decide "whether the Constitution pro-
hibits a state-owned hospital from holding a child for medical reasons against a
parent's wishes," noting that the Supreme Court had yet to mark "the bounda-
ries of a parent's right to control the medical treatment of his or her child or a
medical provider's ability to override a parent's medical decision," and noting
that the Court has recognized in dictum "parents' constitutional liberty interest
in having 'a significant decision-making role concerning medical procedures
sought to be undertaken by state authority upon their children'") (quoting Van
Emrik v. Chemung County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 911 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir.
1990)); HCA, Inc. v. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (mak-
ing a similar statement in dictum); M.N. v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., 648 So.2d
769, 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]he parents' rights are not absolute, as
the state has parens patriae authority to ensure that children receive reasonable
medical treatment which is necessary for the preservation of life. And as
between parent and child, the ultimate welfare of the child is the controlling
factor.") (citations omitted). By statute in many states, medical professionals
may veto the decision of parents voluntarily institutionalizing their children.
See Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).
[I]n the voluntarily commitment setting.., the parents . . . retain a
substantial, if not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a finding
of neglect or abuse .... [H]owever . . . the child's rights and the
nature of the commitment decision are such that the parents cannot
always have absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide whether to
have a child institutionalized. They . . . retain plenary authority to
seek such care for their children, subject to a physician's independent
examination and medical judgment.
Id.
408. Pelias & Blanton, supra note 167, at 532.
409. See generally Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child 3-7 (1973).
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interest of the child test is "vague, subjective, and open to exces-
sive judicial discretion.
The most controversial instance when children's rights
could prevail over parental rights is when they are "wrongfully
born" or born lacking a "sound mind and body." California's
Supreme Court first upheld a cause of action for wrongful life in
1982, when a deaf child sought damages for being "deprived of
the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, func-
tional human being without total deafness."411 This judgment
and others since have been against medical professionals;4 12 how-
ever, children have also received awards against their parents for
allegedly unreasonable decisions; for example, mothers abusing
alcohol or drugs during pregnancy.
413
In dictum, one court stated that parents who decide to pro-
ceed with a pregnancy knowing that the fetus is seriously
impaired should be liable for the "pain, suffering and misery
which they have wrought upon their offspring, "414 whereas
another refused to recognize a child's wrongful life claim against
a physician precisely because it feared that women would eventu-
ally be found liable for proceeding with a pregnancy with knowl-
410. Ilana Hurwitz, Collaborative Reproduction: Finding the Child in the Maze
of Legal Motherhood, 33 CONN. L. REv. 127, 178 (2000) (citation omitted).
411. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. 1982).
412. See, e.g., id. (finding a cause of action for "wrongful life" where a deaf
child sought damages for being "deprived of the fundamental right of a child to
be born as a whole, functional human being without total deafness."); Womack
v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Mich. 1971) (upholding right of eight-year-
old child to sue for injuries suffered in an automobile accident when he was a
four-month old fetus, and finding that "'a child has a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body") ("If the wrongful conduct of another interferes
with that right, and it can be established by competent proof that there is a
causal connection between the wrongful interference and the harm suffered by
the child when born, damages for such harm should be recoverable by the
child.'") (quoting Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960)).
413. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (mother
could be held liable for injury caused to child resulting from use of a prescrip-
tion drug during pregnancy if the use was an unreasonable exercise of parental
discretion); In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding
that newborn suffering drug withdrawal symptoms because of prenatal drug
addiction may be considered a neglected child; added that "[s]ince a child has
a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body.., we believe it is within
the best interest to examine all prenatal conduct bearing on that right.") (cita-
tion omitted). See generally Sam S. Balisy, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The
Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1209 (1987).
414. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980).
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edge of probable fetal impairments.415 Agreeing with the
underlying policy concern of the second court, one commenta-
tor would clarify the "right to a sound body and mind" as the
right to be free from others' noxious conduct, but not to con-
note an affirmative obligation on the part of parents to modify
their genetic endowment.
416
The difficult judgments that courts and legislators will have
to make when deciding whether a parent's decision to refuse
therapeutic GE for her progeny constitutes a fundamental right,
child abuse, activity not in the best interest of the child, or a
wrongful birth are not nearly as substantial when GE is merely
"enhancing." Courts do not ordinarily rule that progeny are enti-
tled to more resources than required to meet the minimum
threshold established by child abuse, welfare, and similar laws.
Thus, although it is not unusual in child support proceedings for
courts to award greater support to the children of wealthy
spouses than poor ones, courts generally do not require parents
to provide greater resources to children than they can afford. By
the same token, children should not have an affirmative right to
genetic enhancements counterbalancing parental rights.
B. Equal Protection
Of course, not everyone will have the wherewithal to obtain
even therapeutic biotechnologies without a vast expansion of the
welfare state; therefore, many will only have the option of nega-
tive eugenics or to bear gen-natural children. As suggested by
the story of Carrie Buck, mandated eugenics programs have his-
torically targeted women and minorities.417 Even today, "'97%
of obstetricians favor sterilizing unmarried welfare mothers.' ,
418
A policy subjecting poor women bearing gen-natural children to
criminal or civil liability would inevitably follow this bankrupt
model.
Even absent liability for gen-natural births, the poor will
likely find themselves severely disadvantaged in a society permit-
ing genetic enhancements. First, minorities may become more
insular. Because HC and GE enable parents to select their off-
spring, some fear that "the offspring qualities most likely to be
415. Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978). California's legisla-
ture apparently agreed with this result and consequently adopted a parents'
immunity statute.
416. Shepherd, supra note 132, at 770-71.
417. Liang, supra note 112, at 77-79; Hyatt, supra note 184, at 484.
418. Liang, supra note 112, at 79 (quoting Lori B. Andrews, Past as Pro-
logue: Sobering Thoughts on Genetic Enthusiasm, 27 SETON HALL L. Rv. 893, 898
(1977)); see also Mass Sterilisation Scandal Shocks Peru, supra note 192.
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selected are those that correlate with high social status," includ-
ing whiteness and maleness.4 19 Second, minorities and the poor
could find themselves at an increasing competitive disadvantage
because of "norm creep. "420 The gap between the abilities of
haves and have-nots would widen as parents with resources raise
the bar of genetic normality through persistent efforts to gain a
genetic advantage over peers.
Although surprisingly few minority scholars have published
on this subject, some feminists have subjected interpretations of
reproductive rights law justifying GE to a "hermeneutic of suspi-
cion." Christine Overall, for example, has shared her concern
that biotechnology could lead to the objectification of children
and women's reproductive capacity.421 This potential is most
obvious with respect to research cloning, but GE could also dis-
advantage women who prefer natural conception. GE is cur-
rently possible solely on ex vivo human embryos and, therefore,
would be easiest in combination with ARTs. However, it is not
inconceivable that GE will also eventually be used in combina-
tion with artificial wombs such as are currently under develop-
ment for animals.422
Traditionally, unequal treatment of persons is unconstitu-
tional. Strict scrutiny applies to any race-specific law disadvantag-
ing or benefiting racial minorities even if facially neutral.4 23 A
neutral law with an incidental disproportionate impact on a
minority is subject to rational basis review.424 A gender-specific
419. Ryan, supra note 393, at 763.
420. See supra Part I(B).
421. CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST
ANALYSIS 170 (1987); see also Michael Lasalandra, Women's Health Activist Wants
Embryo Cloning Halt, B. HERALD, Mar. 5, 2002, at 24 (concerning Judy Nor-
sigian's opposition to human cloning, because "the technology will depend on
thousands, perhaps millions, of women who will have to undergo substantial
health risks associated with harvesting of their eggs").
422. See, e.g., Tony Blankley, Artificial Wombs for Artificial Mons, WASH.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at A21.
423. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (finding
that even a program with a "benign" purpose intending to benefit minorities
with a minimal exclusionary impact is subject to strict scrutiny; however, a pub-
lic entity may have a compelling interest in responding to and remedying the
present effects of past discrimination if an individualized inquiry supports it);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating Virginia statute making it a
felony for any white person to intermarry with a person of color and vice-versa);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (overturning West Virginia stat-
ute limiting jury service to white males who are citizens of the state).
424. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (affirming validity of a
qualifying test measuring verbal ability, vocabulary, and reading comprehen-
sion for entrance to the D.C. police force).
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law disadvantaging one sex compared to another is subject to
intermediate scrutiny,425 whereas a gender-specific law benefiting
females has an unknown constitutional status.4 26 Any law man-
dating GE for purposes of therapy or enhancement without sub-
sidizing the poor would necessarily and not incidentally
disadvantage minorities and women and, therefore, be subject to
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. On the other
hand, subsidizing GE in a race-neutral, gender-neutral, and
potentially even female-biased manner would likely satisfy equal
protection.
III. FRANKENSTEIN MOLLIFIES THE MONSTER
Neither an entirely unregulated nor an over-regulated bio-
technological enterprise is consistent with the prevailing liberal
democratic compromise discussed in the last section. On the
one hand, the free market would inexorably lead to a new politi-
cal economy allowing genetic discrimination in insurance,
employment, and other areas incidental to GS; patents on living
human embryos; negative eugenics through increased abortion
incidental to GS; the creation of living human embryos solely to
destroy and experiment using their parts; born human clones
and chimera; and positive eugenics through GE performed on
human beings and chimera birthed naturally or from artificial
wombs.
On the other hand, in an over-regulated market the state
would prevent or remediate genetic "abnormalities" and "ineq-
uities" by mandating or subsidizing GS and GE. It would further
prohibit employers and insurance companies from utilizing any
genetic information even when it benefits the employee or
insured or could avoid mass injuries (e.g., caused by a trucker
who suffers a predictable coronary attack); implanting living
human embryos regardless of how created; and patents on
425. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating Oklahoma statute
prohibiting sale of non-intoxicating beer to males under the age of 21 and to
females under the age of 18, notwithstanding that the objective of the statute
was to enhance public safety).
426. A gender-specific law benefiting females has not been before the
Court since Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 200. Previously, the Court
approved such laws if they served an important governmental objective. See,
e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding a law which sought to
remedy past discrimination against women by granting them a slight economic
advantage under the Social Security Act); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975) (holding gender-based classifications which benefit women may be legit-
imate where men and women are not similarly situated).
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processes leading to biotechnological inventions including living
human embryos and chimera.
In the first instance, the unregulated market would naturally
create disincentives for parents to have gen-natural children due
to the competitive disadvantage they would face and the medical
costs of children with inherited diseases. The gap between the
haves and have-nots, the Caucasians and minorities, males and
females, and able and disabled would widen. In addition, previ-
ously unknown health and other problems would arise, including
anxiety related to untreatable inherited diseases disclosed
through GS; repercussions from delayed fetal-maternal bonding;
new physical and genetic defects related to flawed HC and GE
often resulting in premature death; families incorporating per-
sons who appear like replicas of deceased or older family mem-
bers or unrelated individuals whose image will be associated with
another person's personality and achievements with unknown
psychological consequences for the clone and others; anxiety
related to choosing the optimal genetic traits for children while
remaining true to religious convictions; and a class of new chi-
mera whose civil rights are yet undefined.
In the second instance, the over-regulated market would
lead to an unprecedented expansion of the welfare state as it
sought to ensure a baseline for genetically healthy humans. Pub-
lic commissions, legislatures, and courts would become bat-
tlegrounds for alternative viewpoints on the illusive minimum
standard of "normal" genetic health the state should ensure.
Norm creep would also commence as entrepreneurial parents
sought to exceed whatever baseline government sets, creating
persistent pressure for the government and others also to raise
their baseline. Government would further infringe upon the
family and religion as the state's equality, economic, and other
interests trumped parental and First Amendment rights to direct
the upbringing of children including their genetic destiny. The
employment and insurance markets would also become overly
distorted ultimately to nobody's benefit.
During the last half-century, liberal democracy has generally
been the most successful when policymakers have chosen middle
ground between the free market and over-regulation, thus seek-
ing balance between the market-friendly utilitarian objectives of
legal positivism and immutable human rights associated with nat-
ural law. Particularly in the field of medicine, legal positivism
has never unequivocally gained the upper hand. Its impact on a
woman's right to choose is obvious. On the other hand, the
Nuremberg Code and Declaration of Helsinki prohibited ultra-
hazardous human subject experimentation. Civil rights laws also
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banned invidious discrimination on the basis of race, gender,
religion, and national origin. In essence, these prohibitions
reflect a liberal democratic consensus that human life and poten-
tial has intrinsic value; consequently, we accept certain inefficien-
cies to protect them.
From the vantage point of two to four decades before the
most sophisticated biotechnologies discussed in this article begin
to diffuse rapidly, we have a unique opportunity to avoid the dis-
placements normally accompanying revolutionary innovations.
Many, if not most of the repercussions are not foreseeable and
will have to be accommodated extemporaneously, but deciding
now how to confront known problems would provide a founda-
tion for confronting others and prevent us from becoming over-
whelmed by the sheer volume of policy decisions that would
passively erode our liberal democratic compromise. Experts at
negotiation contend that one of the keys to developing consen-
sus around difficult issues is to broaden the options for mutual
gain by expanding the menu of issues available for resolution.427
This is another advantage of confronting the panoply of issues
now, rather than deciding them one-by-one. Addressing them
democratically instead of through court-imposed mandates and
neither adding to nor subtracting from the existing liberal demo-
cratic compromise is also important to avoid further fragmenting
the polis.
The last section carefully outlined the existing legal compro-
mise along the following lines: (1) genetic discrimination dis-
advantaging persons on the basis of race, religion, and gender is
unlawful, but genetic discrimination favoring persons on the
basis of gender, intelligence, and other reasons may be permissi-
ble; (2) genetic information should generally be confidential; (3)
negative eugenics in the form of mandated GS is unconstitu-
tional; (4) the right to implant living human embryos may be
fundamental, but not the right to create human clones; (5) the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting the ex vivo living
human embryo; (6) regulating scientific inquiry probably does
not infringe symbolic speech rights particularly if the regulation
concerns research methods; (7) regulating scientific inquiry may
infringe religious expression, but usually without triggering strict
scrutiny; (8) lethal human subject experimentation is unlawful,
as is human subject experimentation preceding sufficient animal
studies, the results of which could be achieved through other
research and incorporating neither informed consent nor legally
427. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WIu.IAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN ch. 4 (2d ed. 1991).
20031
144 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
effective proxy consent; (9) patents on human life and certain
dangerous technologies are unlawful, but not necessarily
processes to produce them; and (10) parental rights to direct the
upbringing of progeny including their genetic destiny are funda-
mental, but parents may not jeopardize the health or safety of
children nor impose excessive burdens upon society.
Below we review a variety of policy recommendations that
would extend this democratic consensus to biotechnology.
Although I seek neither to add to nor subtract from the existing
consensus, this becomes more challenging as the legal issues
become less familiar and jurisprudential philosophies are coun-
terposed. Relatively unsophisticated biotechnologies like GS
raise less compelling legal and moral questions. On the other
hand, applications of existing law to novel issues raised by bio-
technology, like whether to accord any rights to the ex vivo living
human embryo, are more difficult and likely to trigger anxiety
and suspicion.
A. Consensual Recommendations
The first set of policy recommendations already enjoy sub-
stantial popular support and would: (1) render unlawful any
application of biotechnology disadvantaging persons upon the
basis of race, gender, or religion; and (2) treat human genetic
information as confidential. Therefore, in keeping with authority
outlawing invidious discrimination, the insurance industry and
employers would not be able indirectly to discriminate against
particular racial groups or genders by virtue of inheritable dis-
eases disproportionately affecting them. Generally, they would
also not be able to penalize persons for exercising their religious
convictions. On the other hand, employers would be able to take
account of genetic information when persons pose unique risks
to third parties (e.g., airline pilots). Although some would go fur-
ther and preclude all forms of genetic discrimination, the
existing consensus does not require this.
B. Familiar Recommendations
The next set of policy decisions require balancing state
interference with parental, First Amendment, and reproductive
rights with the State's interest in preventing child abuse, serving
the best interests of children, and minimizing healthcare costs.
The application of these legal regimes to HC and GE are new,
but follow predictable patterns. When applied in keeping with
the common law, they do not offend the objectives of positivism
or natural law.
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1. When Parental Rights Should Be Paramount
Existing authority suggests that parental rights should be
paramount in refusing: (1) GS for diseases that are not treatable;
(2) biotechnologies like GS and GE when (a) it is not in the best
interest of the child according to prevalent social norms, (b) it
would not overly burden society, or (c) it would "enhance" the
child or the child's progeny; or (3) GE that is inheritable even if
therapeutic. State infringement upon any of these freedoms
should be subject to strict scrutiny because of parental and per-
sonal autonomy rights. Private infringement should be subject to
liability under Title VII, the ADA, HIPPA, state law, and new
regulations.
Mandating GS for untreatable diseases would have numer-
ous negative psychological and other repercussions without ade-
quate offsetting benefits. Mandating genetic enhancements
would be equivalent to public eugenics. It would inevitably lead
to inequality between the classes and races and coercive abor-
tion, unless heavily subsidized. The savings from reduced long-
term health care costs could theoretically offset the cost of thera-
peutic GE, but not GE that is enhancing.
With respect to inheritable GE even when therapeutic, many
will object to it for deontological reasons that are not necessarily
religious, such as avoiding long-term damage to humankind's
natural genetic patrimony and the ability of future generations to
decide for themselves how to live. Utilitarians also want to
ensure freedom of choice. Therefore, even if the welfare state
dramatically expanded to subsidize inheritable GE, parents
should have an absolute right to refuse it at least until its effect
upon generations of human beings is clear.
2. When Parental Rights Should Not Be Absolute
Existing authority suggests that the state may trump parental
rights in some circumstances when for religious or other reasons
parents would deny their progeny therapeutic GE even after it
becomes safe and subsidized. Subsidized genetic therapy is key
because the State should not be able to overcome a parent's
objection to genetic therapy, or even permit a parent to pay for
the expense of refusing genetic therapy (through higher insur-
ance premiums or otherwise), if the parent cannot afford it.
Otherwise, parents would be penalized for refusing genetic ther-
apy they cannot afford.
Prevailing parental, First Amendment, and equal protection
values suggest that the best way to identify situations when paren-
tal rights should give way to the State's interest in preserving per-
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sonal health and welfare is to subject a parent's exercise of bona
fide religious or other convictions to judicial reversal upon proof
of a compelling state interest pursued in the least restrictive man-
ner.428 Under this standard, the State should generally succeed
over a parent's objection to gene therapy when, for example, a
child's inheritable condition was immediately life-threatening (as
when parents object to blood transfusions in life-threatening cir-
cumstances for their children)429 On the other hand, when par-
ents refuse GS and gene therapy where there is a substantial risk
of an inheritable disease that is disabling, but not life-threaten-
ing, or when a disease is adult-onset in character, parental rights
should ordinarily prevail if we are to continue to respect the free
exercise of religion and parental authority.
In between these scenarios, courts will be left to make hard
decisions about what is in the best interest of the child, for exam-
ple, when medical professionals, state welfare agencies, or one
parent, but not the other believes they have a compelling interest
in performing GS and GE. As before, courts should generally
defer to the objecting party when (1) the reason a healthcare
professional wants to perform GS is linked to an inheritable dis-
ease for which no treatment exists; (2) the particular biotechnol-
ogy under consideration is not proven absolutely safe; and (3)
the health care professional proposes an inheritable genetic
modification.
3. When State Interests Should Be Paramount
Courts should generally consider State interests paramount
when parents seek to reduce or enhance the genetic endowment
of their embryo. The State should be able to regulate either
decision, subject to rational review. As discussed above, distin-
guishing certain enhancements from therapies raises intractable
questions centered on how we define "normal" health;4 30 how-
ever, the alternative to confronting them on a case-by-case basis is
to treat as morally or legally equivalent genetic therapy and
428. In contrast, the state's interests in preventing non-parents like
researchers and businesses from undertaking inheritable and non-inheritable
GE without parental consent should be subject to mere rational basis review in
recognition of the significant countervailing moral and equal protection issues
involved and less substantial fundamental rights at stake.
429. See, e.g., In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio C.P. 1962) (holding that
the court could summarily provide under a state statute for emergency medical
or surgical treatment for any child pending service of a citation upon the par-
ents even where the parents were Jehovah's Witnesses who believed that blood
transfusions were prohibited).
430. See supra Part I(A).
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enhancements when these are no more similar than experimen-
tation and therapy.' 3 '
Medicine and particularly the Human Genome Project and
politics can facilitate or muddle this line-drawing process by
developing a comprehensive list of genetically-linked inheritable
diseases constituting the "abnormal. 43 2 The state's interest in
preventing persons from using GE for purposes other than modi-
fying these abnormal conditions (e.g., for the purpose of modify-
ing eye, skin, and hair color due to time-bound predilections
about physical traits) should generally be deemed adequate if
based on rational concerns.
4. When Women's Rights Should Be Paramount
Women's rights are not ordinarily implicated with respect to
ex vivo living human embryos, but they should be deemed para-
mount if a woman's right to implant human embryos is
threatened. Although it would be consistent with existing prece-
dent to prohibit altogether the creation of human clones,
preventing their implantation is contrary to the goals of both the
pro-choice and pro-life community.
C. The Special Respect Paradigm
The last set of policy recommendations apply existing prece-
dent to novel issues biotechnology raises like whether any
restraints should apply to manipulating the ex vivo living human
embryo to create kids, clones, and chimera. To extend no civil
rights to the living human embryo, but treat it as the moral and
legal equivalent of a thing to be produced, patented, priced, and
purchased would substantially extend utilitarianism beyond its
current foothold in medical science.
In contrast, the concept of special respect for the living
human embryo admits that human life may have intrinsic value
while permitting positivists to help frame the ways government
recognizes this by according some rights of persons to human
431. Statistics will inevitably play an important role in every dispute where
the state or one parent seeks to avoid GE. Experts on both sides will opine on
the probability that a particular gene will lead to certain "abnormal" conditions
and behaviors. Other experts will discuss the extent to which an inheritable
disease is likely to express itself in multiple environments. The statistics and
science-thick nature of this litigation will make it difficult to follow, but juries
are best suited to make these case-by-case factual findings and assess the sincer-
ity of the moral, religious, and other convictions of those involved.
432. Similar attempts to elaborate on abnormal conditions include, for
example, the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual (DSM).
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embryos, but not others. Unlike the property rights model, the
special respect paradigm need not expand or retract the twin
positivist and natural legal foundations of modern law, and,
therefore, better preserves the existing liberal democratic
compromise.
The special respect paradigm also enables us to adopt an
honest, common rhetoric in relation to key terms like "cloning,"
"therapy," "experimentation," and "living human beings" and use
them in their conventional sense, so that we can make hard pol-
icy choices. Distorting rhetoric may subvert the truth and ulti-
mately the law but it cannot undermine the reality.4"3 By
honestly and democratically confronting policy choices imping-
ing on human rights we can decide which substantive rights
should be accorded the ex vivo living human embryo and which
denied without threatening political instability.
Although the list of potential compromises is lengthy, Pro-
fessor Robertson concedes that efforts to limit the number of
cyropreserved embryos,434 regulate destruction of human
embryos,4 35 and restrict or ban non-therapeutic research on liv-
ing human embryos4 3 6 may be constitutional. It is consistent
with the Nuremberg Code and Declaration of Helsinki, for exam-
ple, to require at least the exhaustion of the medical advances
possible with adult stem cell research and already or naturally
deceased human embryos and fetuses before permitting
researchers to terminate more human embryos, much less create
new ones through research cloning.
Patents on human life and chimera also have no precedent
in Western history, unlike patents on processes to create or modify
life. Liberal democracies have banned or monopolized the few
technologiestoo dangerous to proliferate in the free market or
which threaten fundamental human rights while encouraging
the patenting of all other devices. The Nuremberg Code, Decla-
ration of Helsinki, and Human Subjects Policy all ban some types
of scientific inquiry, as do federal statutes on fetal tissue
433. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND
HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY XiV (2002), available at http://www.bio
ethics.gov (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
434. Robertson on Early Embryos, supra note 231, at 499, 504-06.
435. Id.
436. Id.
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research 437 and some state statutes on experimenting with
embryos.
4 38
The United States monopolized and banned nuclear energy,
due partly to its dangerous implications for humanity. Over a
much longer period of time, GE also could modify humanity by
introducing fundamental, inheritable alterations to the human
species and creating new species. Radical repercussions call for
bold initiatives like banning or monopolizing inheritable genetic
engineering and the creation of human clones or refusing to
issue or fully enforce patents relating to them at least until the
long-term medical consequences of GE and HC are obvious.
IV. CONCLUSION
Frankenstein should not have released his innovation into
the world without direction or moral guidance. The responsibil-
ity was his alone to ensure the welfare of his monster and ability
of his community to co-exist. We have a similar responsibility
with respect to creating and modifying clones, kids, and chimera.
Leaving biotechnology to regulate itself would shirk this respon-
sibility, whereas over-regulating it would distort the market.
Accommodating biotechnology by favoring either legal positiv-
ism or natural law would upset an already fragile balance sup-
ported by a fragmented polis. The most feasible solution is
simply to extend the existing liberal democratic compromise
with respect to equal protection, reproductive rights, the First
Amendment, human subject experimentation rules, patent law,
and parental rights. This includes banning or monopolizing cer-
tain biotechnologies and extending substantive special respect to
the ex vivo living human embryo.
437. See National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 § 112, 42
U.S.C. § 289g-2 (1994) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human fetal tissue for valuable con-
sideration if the transfer affects interstate commerce.").
438. See supra note 228.
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